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nouns, "hir" and "hirself," for the archaic his/her and himself/herself, even in instances
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Time constraints imposed by the editors kept these and similar changes from the final
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INTRODUCTION
A civilization of those Indian Nations that live within the British Dominions
in North America by which they might be made acquainted with, and ena-
bled to obtain and enjoy, the conveniences and benefits of a social Life,
taught Agriculture, and some of the more useful arts, and instructed in the
Principles of sound Knowledge; by which their Manners might be humanized,
a rational Submission to wholesome Laws and Regulations introduced, and
their Minds prepared for the Reception of moral Virtues and Christian Doc-
trine; by which, in Time, they might be fitted to intermarry with our plant-
ers, and become profitable Members of the British Commonwealth, and
faithful Subjects to his Majesty and the Laws of the Realm. Such a Civiliza-
tion, no doubt, will appear to be a desirable Object to every humane and
virtuous Mind, and a concern of national Importance to every sincere Lover
of his Country.1
These words, written by a loyal British subject, John Daniel
Hammerer, expressed what was an "enlightened" point of view
during the first half of the eighteenth century. The less "enlight-
ened" and more common view is reflected in the often uttered and
still familiar cliche that "the only good Indian is a dead one." To-
day, neither of these two points of view are very popular, whether
in reference to Native American cultures or cultures located else-
where in the world. We all have grown up in a culture whose edu-
cational system has been affected profoundly by Einstein's disman-
tling of the Newtonian-mechanical view of the world,
anthropology's presentation of seemingly limitless cultural variety,
and the mentality behind the epithet made popular during the
1960s: "different strokes for different folks."
John Daniel Hammerer's words are outrageous; not so much
for their unbridled bigotry, but because they represent the arro-
gance and narrow-mindedness of those who would have the world
believe that "their way" is better than the ways of others, and per-
haps the best for which one can hope,2 simply because it is "their
way." "Enlightened" twentieth-century Western culture no longer
unequivocally endorses statements of absolute knowledge, perfect
understanding, or assertions of truth. Most of these are thought to
be the opinions of "fanatics" (e.g., members of fundamentalist re-
1. J.D. HAMMERER, AN ACCOUNT OF A PLAN FOR CIVILIZING THE NORTH AMERICAN INDI-
ANS. PROPOSED IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 9-10 (1890). This text was published originally
between 1730 and 1740.




ligous movements) or, more likely, leftovers from a time long since
past, when truth, understanding, and clarity were accepted-a
time prior to science's "discovery" that absolute truth is a creation
of the less sophisticated mind. Today we understand that all
things are relative.
The story of relativism-here, cultural relativism-is a story
of power; power disguised as tolerance, disguised as neutrality, dis-
guised as respect for other perspectives. In fact, relativist asser-
tions that absolute truth is inaccessible and perhaps nonexis-
tent-that the best we can ever hope for is knowledge tainted by
our own cultural filters-ensures that all that life can ever be is a
continuous battle of subjective desires. In a "relative world," indi-
viduals and groups impose their desires, their sense of the proper
order of the world, on others. They do so not because they are
right, good, or true. These justifications are not possibilities in a
relative world. Rather, they do so simply because they want to:
power stripped of all pretense.
In this Article, I will examine the assertion of relativity, espe-
cially as it applies to Western understandings of and dealings with
cultures different from our own.3 First, I will present a brief state-
ment of the position of cultural relativism-the relative validity of
the beliefs of one culture when compared with another. Next, I in-
tend to show that the relativist position, articulated by anthropolo-
gists in particular and makers of policies in general, does not make
internal sense; it is inconsistent on its own terms. I will argue that
when relied upon to shape policy-one culture's policy toward an-
other culture with which it is in contact-statements of culturally
relativistic policies simply are instances of rhetoric in the service of
particular interests. The adoption of relativist policy is neither
more nor less (nor other) than political action: Culture A adopts
relativistic attitudes concerning Culture B only when the existence
of Culture B and its practices present no significant threats to Cul-
ture A or when it is to Culture A's advantage to do so. Implicit in
3. This Article makes no real attempt to explain how it is that one recognizes a culture
as different from or similar to one's own; though no doubt the issue of recognizing "the
other" is indeed relevant to the topic at hand. Further, a consideration of the epistemology
of difference is well beyond the scope of this Article. Herskovits's quotation, see infra text
accompanying note 28, is as good a "definition" as any. One might also refer to the "Hart-
Devlin debates," although these do not answer the question either. See P. DEVLIN, Tim EN-
FORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965) and H.L.A. HART, LAW, LmsRTY AND MoRArrry (1963).
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such an assertion is a prediction: Culture A-a culture that might
pride itself on its tolerance, open-mindedness, and overall embrace
of principles of pluralism-will adopt policies toward Culture B
that might be characterized as growing out of ethnocentrism and
intolerance, when Culture B's existence or practices stand in the
way of Culture A's interests.
In order to make this point less abstract, I will present an his-
torical overview of the Western world's (particularly the British
and American) attitudes toward Native Americans. I will discuss
how policies concerning Native American education reflect alerna-
tively ethnocentric and relativistic philosophies, depending upon
the political mood(s) of the times.
I. THE LANGUAGE OF RELATIVISM
A. Some History
The presence of relativistic attitudes in recorded history dates
back at least as far as Ancient Greece: "Fire burns both in Hellas
and Persia; but men's ideas of right and wrong vary from place to
place."4 This quote evinces a concern that would lie at the center
of discourse regarding relativism for years to come: In what sense
can one adopt a position that a particular act or belief is either
right or wrong?
The controversy surrounding the topic of relativism made its
way into the social sciences in the early twentieth century. Accord-
ing to Lowie, 5 the biological and zoological practices of gaining
knowledge by extrapolating backward-using information regard-
ing presently existing plants and organisms in order to learn about
the presumed structure and function of extinct species-gave rise
to what has been called the comparative method of anthropological
investigation. The comparative method has been described in the
following terms: "To apply the comparative method, the varieties
4. ARISTOTLE, NCOMACHEAN ETHICS, quoted in A. FLEW, A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
281 (1979). There is no doubt that conversation regarding the validity of relativism and
absolutism preceded Aristotle's quote. See, e.g., PLATO, THEATETUS 170a-172b. In the course
of this volume concerning the question of the definition of knowledge, Plato critiques the
position of individual relativism. For a brief but comprehensive summary of Plato's assault
on Sophistic rhetoric and its relativistic position, see Hikins, Plato's Rhetorical Theory: Old
Perspectives on the Epistemology of the New Rhetoric, 32 CENT. STS. SPEECH J. 160 (1981).
5. R. LowiE, HISTORY OF ETHNOLOGICAL THEORY 19-29 (1937).
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of contemporary institutions are arranged in a sequence of increas-
ing antiquity. This is achieved through an essentially logical, de-
ductive operation. The implicit assumption is that the older forms
are the simpler ones ....",, The assumption upon which such a
method is based is, quite simply, that merely by looking social
scientists should be able to determine that
the existing races, in their respective stages of progression may be taken as
the bona fide representatives of the races of antiquity.. . . They thus afford
us living illustrations of the social customs, the forms of government, laws,
and warlike practices, which belong to the ancient races from which they re-
motely sprang.
7
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the con-
clusions drawn from observations of "primitive" societies through
the use of the comparative method of investigation were inter-
preted so as to support an evolutionary theory of cultural develop-
ment. Just as the human being was thought to represent the ulti-
mate product of biological evolution, 8 knowledge about "primitive"
cultures was considered evidence in support of the belief that
Euro-American societies were the "flowering[s] of human
experience."
As some historians of this period tell it,11 during the early
1900s the complacent acceptance of the believed cultural superior-
ity of Euro-American society began to be challenged. World War I
and the economic problems that preceded and followed (especially
the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s) pointed
rather dramatically to imperfections in the "flowering of human
experience." Scholars and students of other cultures began to talk
about the adaptability and appropriate adjustments made by indi-
6. M. HARRIS, THE RISE OF ANTHROPOLOGIcAL THEORY 151 (1968).
7. A. LANE Fox PnrT-RIvERs, THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 53 (J.L.
Meyers ed. 1906), quoted in M. HARRIS, supra note 6, at 151.
8. Oddly enough, this point is never questioned by the cultural relativists. Inconsis-
tency is often so convenient.
9. M. HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN CULTURAL PLURALISM 7
(1972). Lowie pointed out that the problems with the interpretations made by the compara-
tive investigators were not necessarily problems with method. R. LowiE, PIMITVE SocmTy
440-41 (1920). Many researchers avoided making the gross generalizations for which com-
parativists have come to be known. For a relatively thorough overview of the history of this
period in the field of anthropology, see M. HARRIS, supra note 6, at 142-79.




viduals and groups in other cultures."" The theory of cultural
evolution came under strong criticism as did the point of view that
human civilizations could be evaluated as either better or worse,
relative to one another. 2
According to Herskovits, reaction against the view that Euro-
American societies were evolved more highly and a stage toward
which all other cultures were moving reached its peak at the end of
World War I with scholarly denial that there are any laws of cul-
tural and social development.23 According to this point of view, it
was impossible to evaluate a culture in terms of good or bad, high
or low, or the like. As Lowie, one of the most outspoken of those
who would be called cultural relativists, put it:
If inherent necessity urges all societies along a fixed path, metaphysicians
may still dispute whether the underlying force be divine or diabolic, but there
can at least be no doubt as to which community is retarded and which accel-
erated in its movement toward the appointed goal. But no such necessity of
design appears from the study of culture history. Cultures develop mainly
through the borrowing due to chance contact. Our own civilization is even
more largely than the rest a complex of borrowed traits. The singular order of
events by which it has come into being provides no schedule for the itinerary
of alien creatures. Hence, the specious pleas that a given people must pass
through such or such a stage in our history before attaining this or that desti-
nation can no longer be sustained.
1 4
For years Lowie continued to argue for the relativist position,
berating the ethnocentric scholars of the past-in particular Lub-
bock.'15 Today, many of Lubbock's conclusions still seem incredible
and hardly what would be considered serious scholarship:
The Adamese have "no sense of shame"; "many of their habits are like those
of beasts." The Greenlanders have no religion, no worship, no ceremonies.
11. The interested reader is directed especially to the work that came out of the In-
stitut d'Ethnologie de Paris after World War I. For an interesting recounting of this period
and its works, see Clifford, On Ethnolgraphic Surrealism, 23 CoMP. STUD. Soc'Y & HIsT. 539
(1981).
12. M. HERsKovrrs, supra note 9, at 7-8.
13. Id.
14. R.H. LowIE, supra note 9, at 440-41 (emphasis added).
15. John Lubbock, a late-nineteenth-century British prehistorian was a significant voice
in evolutionist scholarship. Using the comparative method, borrowed from geological arche-
ology, Lubbock attempted to recreate the life of the "paleolithic" and "neolithic" peoples.
See, e.g., the following works by Lubbock: PRE-HisToRIc TIMEs, As ILLUSTRATED By ANCIENT
REMAINS AND THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF MODERN SAVAGES (1865); THE ORIGIN OF CIVILI-
ZATION AND THE PRIMITIVE CONDITION OF MAN; MENTAL AND SOCIAL CONDITION OF SAVAGES
(1870). For a more detailed treatment, see M. HARMS, supra note 6, at 142-79.
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The Iroquois have no religion, no word for God. Fuegians not the least spark
of religion. "[T]here can be no doubt that, as an almost universal rule,
savages are cruel."1
In light of the growing realization that Euro-American society was
far from perfect, such absolutist, ethnocentric statements led
scholars like Lowie to call for the complete abandonment of all
subjective judgements when viewing other cultures: "Sir John's
[Lubbock] writings teem with subjective judgments, naively passed
on the basis of resemblance to or deviation from European stan-
dards. The Hottentots are 'disgusting,' the Australians 'miserable
savages' . . he is himself constantly mortified, shocked, horrified
by the savage scene."1 In its proper historical perspective, the rise
of cultural relativism must be understood as a reaction against the
frequently incredible and often obnoxious judgments and asser-
tions made by the comparative evolutionists-assertions and judg-
ments based upon a presumed racial superiority of Euro-Ameri-
cans and intended to justify both Euro-American institutions and
Euro-American practices toward the "lesser" peoples of the world.
B. The Relativist Position: The Basic Assumption of Cultural
Relativism
Since the early twentieth century, the relativist position has
been a topic of discussion and debate within the many fields of
science.18 Periodically, someone from within the academic commu-
16. These are quotes and extrapolations from Lubbock's work, quoted by Lowie and
reprinted in M. HARRIS, supra note 6, at 162 (emphasis added).
17. Id. (quote by Lowie commenting on Lubbock's work).
18. The list of authors and articles attempting to explicate the relativist position is
enormous. As might be expected, this has lead to a variety of relativist positions, some ex-
treme, others less so. See, e.g., Leff, In Search of Ariadne's Thread: A Review of the Recent
Literature on Rhetorical Theory, 29 CENT. STS. SPEECH J. 73 (1978); Brummett, A Defense
of Ethical Relativism as Rhetorically Grounded, 45 W.J. SPEECH COM. 286 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter Brummett (1976)]; McGuire, The Ethics 6f Rhetoric: The Morality of Knowledge, 45 S.
SPEECH COM. J. 133 (1980).
See also the literature "dialogues": Brummett, Some Implications of "Process" or "In-
tersubjectivity" Postmodern Rhetoric, 9 PHIL. & RHErOmC 21 (1981) [hereinafter Brum-
mett (1981)]; Orr, How Shall We Say: "Reality Is Socially Constructed Through Communi-
cations"?, 29 CENT. STS. SPEECH J. 263 (1978); Farrell, Knowledge, Consensus, and
Rhetorical Theory, 62 Q.J. SPEECH 1 (1976); Carleton, What is Rhetorical Knowledge? A
Response to Farrell-And More, 64 Q.J. SPEECH 313 (1978); Farrell, Social Knowledge II,
64 Q.J. SPEECH 329 (1978); Cherwitz & Hikins, Towards a Rhetorical Epistemology, 47 S.
SPEECH COM. J. 135 (1982); Croasmun & Cherwitz, Beyond Rhetorical Relativism, 68 Q.J.
SPEECH 1 (1982); Brummett, Consensus Criticism, 49 S. SPEECH COM. J. 111 (1984).
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nity claims to have arrived at a method by which one can evaluate
the progress or superiority of a people or culture from some neu-
tral, objective perspective. 19 Thereafter, champions of the relativist
position are quick to point out the obvious enculturated bias em-
bedded within the "objective" position.
The variety of arguments asserting and defending the relativ-
ist position are diverse and not wholly consistent with one another.
All, however, claim to be representative of cultural relativism in
one form or another. Despite the diversity, there does seem to be a
common thread, an underlying assumption upon which all state-
ments of cultural relativism rely: "Judgements are based on experi-
ence, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of
his own, enculturation." 0 That is, any judgment one makes about
any topic is based upon the experience(s) of the person making the
judgment. One's experience is a function of the culture in which
one lives-or perhaps the culture which "lives inside" the individ-
ual. Thus any judgment must necessarily be, at least in part, a
function of culture.
Three justifications commonly are offered in support of this
underlying assumption. First, the relativist offers empirical evi-
dence that different cultures disagree on standards of normality
and explanations of events. For example, Herskovits uses the ex-
ample of the different attitudes towards and explanations of vari-
Unless otherwise stated, the term "relativism" hereinafter refers to cultural relativism.
19. For one example of this, see M. SAHLINS & E. SERVICE, supra note 2, at 6, which
attempts to justify and further the work of Leslie White. The authors claim that a culture-
free determination of cultural superiority can be made by examining the degree to which a
culture transforms and utilizes energy and integrates that energy into an increasingly com-
plex social order. According to Sahlins and Service, the superior culture is the most
progressed, the largest in scale and complexity, the most environmentally unconstrained.
It is curious that Sahlins and Service failed to recognize any problem with equating in-
creased complexity and productivity with progress and superiority. Recognition of complex-
ity and productivity is indeed a culturally related phenomenon-not all cultures do this.
However, even if one were to accept the proposition that complexity and productivity are
neutral and descriptive, associating these with progress and superiority is simply a return to
the ethnocentric positions of the nineteenth-century Euro-American elitists. For a critique
of the Euro-American cultural notion of progress, see D. Richards, European Mythology:
The Ideology of Progress, in CoNTEMiPoRARY BLACK THOUGHT: ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES IN THE
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 59 (M. Asante & A. Vandi eds. 1980).
20. M. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND His WORKS 63 (1964). Herskovits argues that the state-
ment quoted here is in fact the "principle of cultural relativism." Id. It is, however, more
appropriately described as the assumption upon which the principle of relativism is based,
rather than the principle itself.
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ous states of organismic excitation offered by African Blacks on
the one hand and New World Blacks on the other.21 To the Afri-
can, states of frenzy and excitation might easily be explained as
"possession," the god "come to the head" of the worshipper. The
condition is quite normal and in fact desired by many individuals
among certain cultures. What seems like the same condition is un-
derstood by New World Blacks as an abnormal condition of illness
caused or created by a variety of undesired matrices of conditions
and requiring treatment and cure of one sort or another.
The second and third justifications are related to one another.
Psychologists and scientists who study perception assert that per-
ception is not simply a physiological function whereby raw cues
impinge upon anatomical structures producing physiological
change. Rather, a selection or abstraction process occurs whereby
various cues are selected, organized, and interpreted. This process
of selection, organization, and interpretation is said to be largely a
function of one's prior experiences within a particular cultural
setting.2
Closely related to this perceptual justification is the assertion
that all experience is mediated by one's symbol system. What
counts as experience is dependent upon the nature-both the
structure and content-of one's symbolic universe. The linguistic
relativists,23 upon whose work this justification rests, claim that
someone whose language is based upon a linguistic structure differ-
ent from the linguistic structure of the romance languages has a
significantly different experience of the world than one who speaks
21. M. HEESKovrrs, supra note 9, at 19-21.
22. Support for this thesis is extensive. See, e.g., A. KoRZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANrrr.
AN INTRODUCTION TO NON-ARISTOTELIAN SYSTEMS AND GENERAL SEMANTICS (1958); H.
BROWN, PERCEPTION, THEORY AND COMMITMENT (1977); T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); P. WATZLAWICK, How REAL Is REAL? (1976); B. WHORF, LAN-
GUAGE, THOUGHT, AND RALrrY (1956). An examination of any number of books or articles
from the many schools of symbolic interactionism is also useful. See, e.g., G.H. MEAD, MIND,
SELF AND SOcIrY (1934). For those less trusting of the "softer sciences," one might begin
with the standard physiology text, A. VANDER, J. SHERMAN & D. LUCIANO, HUMAN PHYSIOL-
OGY-THE MECHANISMS OF BODY FUNCTION (1975).
23. Linguistic relativity is sometimes referred to as the "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis," af-
ter two major proponents of the theory, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. The asser-
tion is that peoples' experiences and perceptions of reality are a function of the structure of
their languages. For a brief description, see S. LiTTLEJOHN, THEORIES OF HUMAM COMMUNI-
CATION, 131-33 (1978). For a more thorough understanding, see E. SAPIR, LANGUAGE: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SPEECH (1921); B. WHORF, supra note 22, at 1-34.
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(thinks) in a traditional Euro-American language. As one linguistic
relativist put it: "[W]e dissect nature along lines laid down by our
native languages." 24 An objective view of reality is impossible.
It is quite clear that the spokespersons for relativism believe
that cultural subjectivity affects all matters of judgment. Relativ-
ists claim that any assertion of "objective truth"-whether con-
cerning morality or so-called factual data-can be understood as
ethnocentric and based upon invalid assumptions of similarity
among cultures. Statements regarding another culture that are
based upon such an assumption are considered by the relativist to
be either falsely grounded or, more likely, erroneous.
C. The Principle of Relativism
From the basic assumption that all judgment is based upon an
individual's enculturated experience, follows the principle of rela-
tivism.25 Since all perceptions and interpretations of fact and
value20 inevitably are rooted in culture-bound subjectivity, there
exists no basis upon which one set of beliefs and understandings
about the world can be said to be correct and another mistaken.
That is, since all evaluation and understanding is culture bound,
there is no culturally free way of evaluating any assertion of fact or
value. An alternative reading of the relativist position is that one
set of beliefs is no more or less correct than another.
Although the difference between the two relativist positions is
not always critical, there is indeed a difference. The first position
states that we have no way of knowing whether one culture's be-
liefs are correct and another's incorrect. The second claims that
there is no possibility of the existence of objective and absolute
standards of either moral or factual truth. Neither position allows
for the possibility of making a culture-free judgment concerning
the superiority-moral or otherwise-of one culture over another.27
24. B. WHORF, supra note 22, at 213.
25. Perhaps a better expression is "principles of relativism," since it is not at all clear
that there exists a single relativist assumption.
26. The distinction between fact and value is merely conventional. Ultimately, the two
cannot be maintained as separate categories.
27. The distinction between these two does not make a great'deal of difference for the
purposes of this Article, except when it comes to understanding the problems of relying on
cultural relativism as a viable methodological approach. This will be discussed further on.
See infra text accompanying notes 38-48. Cf. Croasmun & Cherwitz, supra note 18, at 1-3,
who suggest that the difference is one of epistemology and ontology.
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According to the proponents of relativism, it is important to
bear in mind that cultural relativism makes its claim with regard
to the impossibility of culturally free evaluation of cultures, not
about the values, beliefs, practices and mores of individuals or
groups within a culture:
Cultural relativism, in all cases, must be sharply distinguished from concepts
of the relativity of individual behavior, which would negate all social controls
over conduct.. . . The very core of cultural relativism is the social discipline
that comes of respect for differences-mutual respect. Emphasis on the worth
of many ways of life, not one, is an affirmation of the values in each culture.
Such emphasis seeks to understand and to harmonize goals, not to judge and
destroy those that do not dovetail with our own. 2s
Behavioral anarchy is not a tenet of cultural relativism.
In addition, many relativists think it significant that they do
not deny the existence of universal cultural forms. Instead, the rel-
ativist rejects only fixed absolutes:
To say that there is no absolute criterion of values or morals, or even, psycho-
logically, of time or space, does not mean that such criteria, in differing
forms, do not comprise universals in human culture. Morality is a universal,
and so is enjoyment of beauty, and some standard of truth.. . . The many
forms these concepts take are but products of the particular historical experi-
ence of the societies that manifest them. . . . But the basic conceptions re-
main, to channel thought and direct conduct, to give purpose to living.2 9
D. Forms of Relativism
Although one can extract three forms of relativism from the
writings of many of its proponents, Herskovits was the first to ar-
ticulate the importance of clearly distinguishing three overlapping
but discernably distinct roles in the service of which cultural rela-
tivism is given life in the world of human activity.30 Relativism can
be understood as method, philosophy, and practice.
As method, in contrast to the ethnocentric position of Lub-
bock and his fellow nineteenth- and twentieth-century compara-
tivists, the relativist position asserts that "the modern [relativistic]
scientific procedure is to refrain from all subjective pronounce-
28. M. HERSKOVITS, supra note 9, at 11. It is not at all clear that distinguishing between
the relativity of individual and of cultural behavior makes relativism nonjudgmental. See
infra section HI(E).
29. M. HERSKOVrrs supra note 9, at 32.
30. Id. at 32-33.
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ments." 1 Relativists claim that in order for one to be truly objec-
tive when studying another culture (or as nearly objective as hu-
manly possible), one must suspend to the greatest extent possible
one's own judgments, beliefs, and culturally-shaped interpretation,
and simply report the observed behavior in terms of the estab-
lished relationships within the culture itself.s2 That is, one must
attempt to observe and understand a culture on its own terms.
Having accumulated (relatively) objective and unbiased infor-
mation concerning the behaviors and beliefs of others, one begins
to understand all behaviors and beliefs-and, in fact, culture it-
self-as the result of historically and contextually specific forces of
conditioning. Relativism as philosophy becomes an epistemological
view which recognizes the force of enculturative conditioning and
historically particular situational factors that result in a culture's
being the way it is. Although perhaps not completely rejecting a
theory that all cultures pass through similar phases of evolution,
relativist philosophy rejects the blind acceptance of the cultural
evolutionist viewpoint. Values, practices, and beliefs of particular
cultures are understood as unique creations; they can only be un-
derstood in terms of the unique characteristics that have emerged
under particular historical conditions.3
Armed with philosophical principles of relativism derived from
data collected in accord with the rules of relativist methodology,
31. R. LowiE, supra note 5, at 25.
32. See M. HERSKOVrrS, supra note 9, at 32-33.
33. It is no surprise that many of the noted relativists of the twentieth century have
adopted the same point of view. Many of these individuals-among them Lowie, Mead,
Sapir, Herskovits, Benedict, Montagu, and Kroeber-were trained by Franz Boas, perhaps
the most influential anthropologist of the twentieth century. Boas insisted that one could
not (yet) understand the emergence and existence of particular cultures as the result of the
workings of some theoretical universal process of cultural evolution. Although he did not
reject the possibility of a universal guiding principle by which one might understand the
existence of all cultural forms, he insisted that any such principle could only be discovered
by an inductive research method-studying many particular instances of cultural variety
and only then deriving a universal theoretical principle. Boas was reacting to the then prev-
alent method of anthropological research-fitting discovered instances of cultural variety
into the preexisting theory of cultural evolution. Boas insisted that ethnographic research in
the field ought to be a methodological threshold for any student seeking entrance into the
profession. Although Boas himself did not reject the possibility of a universal theory of cul-
tural evolution completely, many of his students did not maintain as open a mind on this
point. For further reading on the influence of Boas, see M. HARIs, supra note 6, at 250-89;
M. HERSKovrrs, FRANz BoAs (1953). See also F. BoAs, RACE, LANGUAGE AND CULTURE (1948)
(author's discussion of the proper goals of anthropological research).
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one develops practices and principles of conduct, intended to en-
sure the development and implementation of relativistic policies to
be used in instances of intercultural contact. The relativist calls for
tolerance toward all cultures, a respect for their individual integ-
rity and dignity, and actions that support (or at least are not detri-
mental to) their continued survival:
In prescribing for other peoples a social programme we must always act on
subjective grounds; but at least we can act unfettered by the pusillanimous
fear of transgressing a mock-law of social evolution. Nor are the facts of cul-
ture history without bearing on the adjustment of our own future. To that
planless hodge-podge, that thing of shreds and patches called civilization,
its historian can no longer yield superstitious reverence. He will realize better
than others the obstacles to infusing design into the amorphous project; but
in thought at least he will not grovel before it in fatalistic acquiescence but
dream of a rational scheme to supplant the chaotic jumble. -
A call for tolerance toward other ways of living, behaving, believ-
ing, and in all ways ordering one's world resulted not only from the
intellectual understanding of the impossibility of the existence of
absolute cross-cultural standards, but also from the felt and ob-
served destructive results of the imposition of an alien will on the
ways of another culture. Relativist practice sought to avoid this
destruction.
3 5
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE RELATIVIST POSITION
This section examines the internal consistency of the relativist
position. As previously stated, I will argue that the relativist posi-
tion is inconsistent on its own terms. Cultural relativism can only
make sense if it is considered in terms of its politics, the interests
it supports.
A. The Relativity of Fact and Value
Relativism relies upon the basic assumption that all state-
ments of fact and value necessarily are culturally and historically
specific; no fact or value accepted by one culture necessarily has
any validity for another, nor can they be considered to have been
34. R. LowrE, supra note 5, at 441, quoted in M. HERSKovrrs, supra note 9, at 8 (em-
phasis added).
35. It must be noted that some relativists (e.g., Herskovits) made reference to "posi-
tive" aspects of ethnocentrism-group cohesion, cultural identity and the like. See M. HER-
SKovrrs, supra note 9, at 75, 81-82.
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valid at other times. Likewise, what is a factual or moral verity
today need not be such tomorrow. In short, the relativists assert
that a belief in the certainty of either fact or value, unmediated by
the culture and times within which one lives, is utter nonsense:
"To be a relativist about value is to maintain that there are no
universal standards of good and bad, right and wrong..... To be a
relativist about fact is to maintain that there is no such thing as
objective knowledge of realities independent of the knower."36
The difficulty with such a position is immediately evident.
Relativism states as a matter of fact either that there is no such
thing as a set of beliefs or understandings more correct than any
other, or, in the alternative, that all beliefs and values are cultural
and thus we can never know if one set or another is correct for all
cultures. At the same time, the relativist insists that all knowledge
is in a sense "tainted by" or "infused with" culture and thus can-
not be relied upon as valid or correct. Accepting the premise upon
which the relativist position rests-the nonexistence of or the in-
ability to know objectively true, unmediated facts or val-
ues-necessitates the rejection of the asserted validity of the rela-
tivist position as well. Relativism is reduced from a statement
thought by its proponents to be true, to a subjective belief, the
unique product of the culture in which it occurs.3 7 Other than the
fact that relativism is a widely accepted viewpoint in our culture,
there is no reason to believe it; relativity enjoys no privileged
position.38
36. A. FLEw, supra note 4, at 281.
37. The term "unique to our culture" is not intended to suggest that no other cultures
hold relativistic beliefs. However, there certainly are cultures that do believe in objective
truth, facts, and values by which one can evaluate all others. See, e.g., B. JOHANSEN & R.
MAESTAS, WASI'CHu: THE CONTINUING INDIAN WARS (1979); J. FIRE/LAME DEER & R. ERDOES,
LAME DEER: SEEKER OF VISIONS (1972); J.H. BODLEY, VICTIMS OF PROGRESS 1-22 (1975); M.
MARGOLIN, THE WAY WE LIVED (1981); V. DELORIA, THE M TAPHYSICS OF MODERN Exis-
TENCE (1979).
38. A thorough response to the assertion that cultural relativism is hopelessly contra-
dictory can he found in Dixon, Is Cultural Relativism Self-refuting?, 28 BRIT. J. Soc. 75
(1977). Dixon claims that to state that "[ilt is true that there are no truths" would indeed
be self-refuting. Id. at 81. He nevertheless contends, with regard to the assertion that "all
truths are culturally relative," that "[h]owever doubtful one might be about the ring of
unfalsifiability or tautology of such a statement, it cannot surely be held to be self-refuting."
Id. Dixon seeks to redefine the word "truth."
To a relativist, truth is not absolute. This is a relativistic definition; if everyone under-
stood "truth" this way, there would be no need for cultural relativism. To one who believes




The problems with cultural relativism do not stop with its in-
herent inconsistency. As a guiding force behind a scientific meth-
odology-in particular, anthropological methodology-proponents
of relativism claim that it is an accurate, reliable and (relatively)
nonsubjective means of describing the beliefs and practices of an-
other culture.39 The relativistic researcher seeks to "refrain from
all subjective judgements." Although relativists acknowledge that
total objectivity is impossible, the effort to move in the direction of
objectivity is considered essential.
The value of relativism as method suffers from numerous
flaws, all relating back to relativism's essential fallacy. First, and
perhaps most obvious, according to relativism all perception is in-
evitably shaped by the culture within which the perceiver is im-
mersed. The claim that one can somehow step outside of culture
by becoming aware that it affects what and how one sees and un-
derstands is unfounded. The presumption that one can see through
the distortion imposed on one's vision by an enculturated past pre-
supposes the existence of a value-free objective place from which
one can locate accurately and negate the "silent workings" of cul-
ture. But such a place, a privileged position according to whose
criteria one can "see clearly," is precisely what the relativists have
insisted is at least inaccessible and, quite likely, nonexistent. Thus,
according to the relativist position, the desired movement toward
objectivity of the relativistically guided scientific method is an
impossibility.
40
One need not rely upon the assertion that perceptions are in-
evitably valued in order to discount the claim that cultural relativ-
ism functions as a credible methodology. The desire for an objec-
tive scientific method-a means by which one acquires knowledge
in an orderly, measured fashion-is itself peculiar to a particular
cultural view. Other cultures obtain their truths in numerous ways,
using numerous methods. Scientists consider many of these meth-
"culturally relative" is to say- "There are only opinions (relative truths); there are no True
statements." In other words: "In our opinion there are only opinions." There is surely no
reason to believe that opinion.
39. See R. Lowis, supra note 5; See also M. HARms, supra note 6.
40. I am well aware that this argument eliminates-or at least negates the value of- all
positivist science. This does not trouble me at all.
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ods supernatural, superstitious, and just plain "hocus-pocus. "41
Some involve the ingesting of what science calls "mind-altering
substances."42 Others require that the desiring knower participate
in "ecstatic experiences. 4 All of these cultures, and perhaps all
cultures, believe their truths, rely upon them, and trust them; their
truths shape their worlds. Our science, with its goal of objectivity,
is no less a cultural form: "One of the proudest achievements of
our civilization is the development of the scientific approach to the
problems of life. . . . [T]he essence of a philosophy based on the
scientific method is constant questioning, continuous analysis,
never-ending skepticism."4 4 The major difference between the rela-
tivist method of truth-finding-science-and the methods of other
cultures is that other cultures accept as true both the methods and
their fruits-the knowledge obtained-whereas the relativist offers
a method of inquiry, none of whose fruits can ever be accepted:
"constant questioning, continuous analysis, never-ending skepti-
cism." Only the method remains, continuously generating relative
knowledge (if indeed that which is relative can be considered
knowledge), never daring to turn on itself4" for fear that it too
41. Perhaps the classic example is E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, ORACLES AND
MAGIC AMONG THE AZANDE (1937). For a more recent discussion, see Statement of 186 Lead-
ing Scientists Against Astrology, HUMANIST, Sept./Oct. 1975, at 43. A critique of this state-
ment can be found in P. FEYERABEND, SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY 91-96 (1978).
42. See generally C. CASTANEDA, THE TEACHINGS OF DON JUAN: A YAQUI WAY OF
KNOWLEDGE (1968); P.T. FURST, FLESH OF THE GODS: THE RITUAL USE OF HALLUCINOGENS
(1972).
43. See, e.g., J. FIRE/LAME DEER & R. ERDOES, supra note 37; A. HULTKRANTZ, THE
RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS (M. Setterwall trans. 1979).
44. M. HERSKOVITS, supra note 9, at 6.
45. There have been many critiques of science and the scientific method. Although the
arguments presented in these critiques are cogent, they have never received general accept-
ance. Science is still close to being a god, and gods do not die easily. See, e.g., P. FEVER-
ABEND, AGAINST METHOD (1978); Bohm, Science as Perception Communication, in THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES (F. Suppe ed. 1974).
Although beyond the scope of this Article, a further criticism of the reliance on the rela-
tivist position as a method for achieving (or approaching) scientific objectivity is the recog-
nition that what counts as "science" is politically motivated and historically specific. At any
moment in history, science and so-called scientific objectivity serves certain interests. One
need only recall the stories of Galileo's and Copernicus's difficulties with the Catholic
Church, or look at the pattern of distribution of research funds in the fields of medicine,
computer technology, geology, or the like to recognize at least some of the politics of science.
See generally P. FEYERABEND, supra; see also A. GORZ, ECOLOGY AS POLITICS (1980); I. IL-
LICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS (1976).
For an intriguing perspective regarding the subtle relationships of power involved in all
that we consider to be knowledge, see the works of Michel Foucault, particularly DISCIPLINE
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might vanish along with its created mercurial knowledge.4
C. As Philosophy
An examination of the philosophy compelled by cultural rela-
tivism adds little that has not been stated already. A relativistic
epistemology requires that one reject the possibility of certainty;
all that we can ever know will be mediated by our culture in one
way or another, and thus, will necessarily be un"true." I have al-
ready attempted to show that any such claim requires a rejection
of itself, since its genesis is culturally influenced and thus "true"
only from a particular cultural viewpoint, but inapplicable to, and
perhaps useless in understanding others. This argument need go
no further.
One of the relativists' more intriguing assertions is that rela-
tivism requires a rejection of the possibility of absolute criteria by
which cultures can be evaluated but not certain other universal
(pan-cultural) human considerations." It is not at all clear that
this distinction adds anything to the relativist position. Saying
that two cultures have standards of morality-rules of behavior,
the transgression of which are said to be bad or wrong-says only
that our culture identifies the existence of a human "culture," in
AND PUNISHMENT (1977); THE HISTORY OF SEXuALITY, VOLUME ONE: AN INTRODUCTION (1978);
POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980). For a concise treatment of the relationship between Foucault's
work on knowledge/power and law, see Katz, Foucault For Lawyers (originally distributed
in 1982 by Buffalo Critical Legal Studies; to be published in vol. 33 of the Buffalo Law
Review).
46. There is an additional objection to the relativist claim that one must suspend one's
value judgments in order to report the practices of other cultures accurately. Harris states
this objection quite clearly.
The preposterous assumption here is that reliable descriptions of cannibalism
and infanticide cannot be achieved by ethnographers who openly oppose these
practices. But the two functions are not at all incompatible. We must presume at
least that reliable descriptions have been submitted by ethnographers who
openly expressed their distaste for cannibalism.
M. HARRIS, supra note 6, at 163. This is not a critique of the internal consistency of cultural
relativism, nor can it be substantiated. Rather, it is an assertion that rests on the author's
"common sense" view of the world. In some sense it represents a position directly opposed
to the relativist perspective; it eschews any recognition of the underlying assumption of
relativism-one's perception is shaped by one's culture. Harris' position adds nothing to the
argument presented here. At the same time, as with many "common sense" assertions, it is
highly regarded in some circles and accordingly should be noted.
47. See M. HERSKOVITS, supra note 9, at 32.
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part, by the presence of those standards of group behavior.4 8 The
same is true for other so-called universals-e.g., beauty, truth, gen-
der, etc. Beyond this, the relativist can say nothing about the par-
ticular standards of one culture versus those of another, other than
call attention to differences and similarities.
Moreover, the relativist can never be sure that what is recog-
nized as morality in one culture has anything to do with the so-
called morality of another. Categories such as morality (truth,
beauty, gender, etc., as well) are researchers' categories, not neces-
sarily the categories of another culture. The cultural relativist al-
ready has told us that our understandings of ourselves and others
are all tainted with our own cultural subjectivity. The epistemol-
ogy that necessarily follows from the relativist position requires
that one understand all knowledge to be statements about the
knower, not the object of inquiry; statements that can never lead
to anything but temporary conclusions, since any attempts to in-
terpret the results of our self-reflection are always subject to the
same cultural distortion from which the results were derived. One
is left again with nothing but descriptions upon which one cannot
rely, since they are always tinted by the "cultural lenses" worn by
the describer.
D. As Practice
Cultural relativists have not limited their assertions of the in-
commensurability of cultures to the worlds of research and schol-
arship (method and philosophy). Relativist philosophy is said to
provide guidelines and considerations to be used when formulating
and enacting policies to regulate cross-cultural contact. 9 Since one
cannot judge whether any culture's beliefs and practices are good
or bad, right or wrong, one ought to practice tolerance; one ought
not act in such a way as to inhibit another culture's ability to be as
it is and act as it does. Such a practice is not followed easily; in
48. Preserving the nonrelativity of universal categories might also be a way of distin-
guishing human from nonhuman "cultures." If one were to deny universal categories-truth,
beauty, morality, etc.-there would remain only biological or behavioral means by which one
could distinguish human groups from nonhuman groups. By preserving these categories one
retains a means of identifying human groups more easily: "A human group is a collection of
organisms that have standards of truth, beauty, morality, etc."
49. Facile assertions of this sort are widespread. See, e.g., M. ASANTE, E. NEWMARK & C.
BLAKE, HANDBOOK OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION (1979).
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fact, not a single (vocal) relativist truly supports it.
Again the problems are evident. Were one to take seriously the
"practical relativist imperative" described above, one would be
forced to adopt a policy of nonintervention. Because we have no
basis by which to evaluate the practices of another culture in terms
of right or wrong, we are told that we, as a culture, must tolerate
the practices of all other cultures. Few people would have trouble
tolerating the existence of a culture whose diet includes dog and
snakemeat. Fewer people would tolerate a culture's granting per-
mission to its young male members to gang rape a young woman
who has chosen to marry for love when the rules of that culture
dictate otherwise. .But not even the most strident of the relativists
insists that our culture ought to tolerate behavior akin to the activ-
ities of Nazi Germany and the hordes of Ghenghis Khan. Relativ-
ists draw lines beyond which their tolerance will not extend.5
What are we to make of this? On the one hand, we are told
that none of the judgments we make about the activities practiced
by others in another culture are valid except, perhaps, in our own
eyes. There is no absolute right or wrong. And yet, we are told that
certain practices cannot, will not, and ought not be tolerated. What
strength are we to give to the words of relativist method and phi-
losophy when in practice those words seem to take on a wholly
different meaning? Perhaps this is too harsh a criticism. Perhaps
the relativist position ought to be understood as applying only to
situations that fall within certain unspecified parameters. But how
are we to recognize these sorts of situations, to describe the param-
eters beyond which philosophy need not be put into practice?
One plausible response is that it is only appropriate to prac-
tice relativism when the culture toward which one's practices are
directed is not destructive. One need not tolerate genocide, institu-
tionalized torture, and similar cruel or evil activities, even when
they are the norm of a particular culture.
However, whose standards of cruelty are to be used? How
shall we determine whether the caste system of India or racist
practices of the United States and South Africa are cruel or de-
structive? Are we not called upon to use our own standards of
value and perceptions of fact to decide how it is that others ought
50. See, e.g., S. MosER, ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM IN ETHics 153-87 (1968)1 M. HER-
SKoVrrs, supra note 9, at 32, 75.
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to live? Or must we only impose our standards on another culture
if its practices harm people physically? Does this standard include
the destruction of the bodies of individuals who breathe air that
has been polluted by industrial wastes, or only individuals who are
sent to their death in gas chambers? And upon whose definition of
"bodily effect" shall we rely? Does the body end with the flesh or
ought we to consider a more expanded notion of "body" held by
other cultures?
All of these unanswered questions force the relativist to draw
lines and make distinctions using standards that we are told (by
the relativists) have no basis outside a particular culture. Further-
more, when relativists draw lines, they are taking a position
which in no way distinguishes them from many reflective moral ab-
solutists who categorically condemn certain "atrocious" and "im-
moral" behaviors. The relativists can be understood as stating that
cultures which practice policies we consider humanitarian,
nondestructive, nonaggressive, and the like ought to be permitted
to continue their practices; those that do not cannot be tolerated.
In the realm of practice, relativism vanishes. So-called value-free
positions are not maintained; contradictions abound. As Moser
puts it:
On the one hand, these are the various epistemological and metaethical posi-
tions which lead the relativist to skepticism as far as cross-cultural value
judgements are concerned. On the other hand, his liberal, humanitarian atti-
tude prompts him to oppose the superiority complex of Euramerican civiliza-
tion, its inhumanity toward other peoples, and its obtuseness in the matter of
understanding other cultures. From this combination of heterogeneous rea-
sons results the relativistic set of values, in which the right of a people to be
different and to preserve its own way of life seem to eclipse all other values.
8 2
51. Herskovits is perhaps the most notable. See generally M. HERSKOVITS, supra note
9. There are others. For an expression of the relativist position, see the Statement on
Human Rights which the executive Board of the American Anthropological Association sub-
mitted to a U.N. Commission trying to formulate a declaration of human rights. Executive
Bd. of the Am. Anthropological Ass'n, Statement on Human Rights, reprinted in 49 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 (1947) (submitted to the United Nations Comm'n on Human Rights).
The Statement was drafted by Herskovits. See also Steward, Comments on the Statement
on Human Rights, 50 Am. ANTHROPOLOGIST 351 (1948) (criticizing Statement on Human
Rights). For a (failed) attempt to salvage Herskovits's and the relativists' view, see Kovisto,
Moral Judgements and Value Conflict, 12 PHIL. Sci. 57 (1945).
52. S. MOSER, supra note 50, at 186 (emphasis added). At times, Herskovits calls for a
balance between what he considers two polar opposites: relativism and ethnocentrism. How-
ever, to choose the proper balance, one must rely upon 6ne's culturally "tainted" judgment.
The call for balances does nothing to answer the question: "Whose balance shall we adopt?"
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The "relativists' values," as Moser refers to them, result in selec-
tive toleration. One need not tolerate the Nazi regime, the institu-
tionalized racism of South Africa, nor the ethnocentric imperialis-
tic endeavors of Europe and America in their dealings with other
cultures. How to recognize the line beyond which toleration need
not be "practiced" remains a mystery.
5 3
E. Norm, Difference, Transformation: The Definition of a
Culture
The incoherence of relativism seems to grow when one consid-
ers the relativist distinction between individual and cultural rela-
tivism. Cultural relativists insist that they are discussing only the
incommensurability of cultural beliefs, and are not saying that one
must be equally tolerant of every individual within a particular
culture. Cultural relativists respect and tolerate the beliefs and
practices of a culture "as a whole," but not necessarily the noncon-
forming beliefs of individuals within that culture. Thus, the rela-
tivist supports the status quo, the established and dominant order
of that culture. 4
See M. HERSKovrrs, supra note 9, at 75.
53. Critics who read this Article during its genesis have claimed that there are methods
by which one can "recognize the line" and thus justify ethical decisions regarding the prac-
tices of other cultures and people. One of these relies upon a concept referred to as the "Self
as a Field of Selves." Essentially the claim is that since a person (a self) is a product of the
community (other selves), any denial of affiliation with that community and its standards
need not be accepted. That is, "once you're in, you can't get out." For a discussion of this
concept, see W.C. BOOTH, MODERN DRAMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASS.NT 126-37 (1974).
Another method relies upon a concept referred to as the "Great Reservoir of Good Rea-
sons." This "strategy" asserts that the violation of one community ethical standard, even if
the violator rejects that standard, might also violate other community standards that the
violator accepts. For example, punishing a murderer who rejects the community standard
that prohibits murder can be justified by punishing the murderer for disturbing the peace, a
community standard that the murderer has (perhaps) not rejected. See Brummett (1981),
supra note 18, at 296-98.
Neither of these methods "recognize the line"; rather, each constructs it. The first (Self
as a Field of Selves) simply imposes upon all individuals a rule regarding community bound-
aries and membership: "Once you're in, you can't get out." See infra note 57. In a world of
only relative truth, there is no moral justification for favoring this rule over some other, for
instance, "I can get out anytime I want to." The second (Great Reservoir of Good Reasons)
is a technical trick; a search for a way to feel justified when imposing one version of commu-
nity values upon whomever is forced into that community.
54. This understanding of the dynamics of cultural relativism and those who profess
and practice the doctrine is not espoused by this author alone, nor is it solely the viewpoint
of those who play out relativism on its own terms:
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Relativists have placed themselves in an uncomfortable and
elusive position when it comes to cultural reform. Intracultural
conflict and tension-for instance, an internal revolution against
the established order-cannot be supported by relativists, since ac-
cording to the relativists a sharp distinction is necessary between
cultural relativism and "the relativity of individual behavior which
would negate all social controls over conduct."55 Social controls are
necessary, say the relativists, in order for a culture to exist. At the
same time, the relativists must allow for some cultural transforma-
tion from within, since to impede the ways of a culture is to impose
an external order. Which sorts of transformation and intracultural
calls for change count as the ordinary "workings of a culture" (and
therefore are to be supported), and which are those sorts of "indi-
vidual episodes" in defiance of social controls (the sort of activity
that would only be supported by the individual relativist, repre-
senting a threat to "all social controls," and thus to the culture
itself)? Relativism provides no answer. Its proponents must take
no sides since to do so would be to make a judgment regarding
cultural preferences, contrary to relativist doctrine.
A transformation from without, the sort of situation which
gave birth to cultural relativism, must be looked upon with disfa-
vor. However, a similarly focused transformation whose origin is
from within might be seen as normal cultural transformation, of no
special danger, and thus the sort of intracultural activity that
ought to be supported and studied.
The sorts of intracultural changes that the dominant order of
a culture understands as signs that the proponents of such changes
are no longer members of the dominant culture, but instead have
become "invaders" from without, present still more problems for
the relativists. The "invaders" see themselves as trying to change
In various parts of the world, according to Levi-Strauss, people now find it dis-
tasteful to be subjected to ethnographical investigation. The mere fact that we
study their beliefs and customs which differ from our own seems to them to
confer upon these differences an absolute status. The natives prefer to regard
the differences as merely temporary.
S. MosER, supra note 50, at 187.
Modem anthropology finds itself in a dilemma: "For it is out of deep feeling of respect
toward cultures other than our own that the doctrine of cultural relativism evolved; and it
now appears that this doctrine is deemed unacceptable by the very people in whose behalf it
was upheld." Levi-Strauss, The Disappearance of Man, 7 N.Y. Rav. BooKs (1966), quoted
in S. MOSER, supra note 50, at 187.
55. M. HanSKoVrrS, supra note 9, at 11.
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the ways, and perhaps what they consider the abuses, of the past.
Whose definition of the culture's boundaries will be accepted?
Herskovits suggests that the relativists must accept the cultural
definition offered by the dominant order, for the deviants re-
present the threat to "social controls over conduct.""8 But why not
accept the deviants' definition of their culture? The relativist has
no basis by which to make such a judgment. Suppose that both the
deviants and the dominant order agree-this sort of change indeed
does indicate that its proponents are no longer members of the
dominant order's culture. What does the relativist do then, casti-
gate the old for trying to prevent and destroy the new, or the re-
verse? How are any of these selections regarding cultural definition
and practice to be made? According to whose definitions? Must
the dominant order be supported simply because it is dominant?
Whose standards will dictate such action, those of the dominant
order? Those of the deviants? Perhaps the standards of the "val-
ueless," "standardless" relativists themselves?5"
Again, it is clear that relativism by its own words has de-
scribed a set of doctrines that in no way can solve the problems it
confronts. Far from the supposedly coherent and consistent theory
so vigorously defended by its proponents, relativism presents a
continually fluctuating conception of the world. Notions of normal-
ity, similarity, difference, and change are permitted to shrink, ex-
pand, and change shape according to the needs and perceptions of
the relativist. One must accept and support normality-the cul-
tural definition offered by its dominant members-when consider-
56. Id.
57. Many versions of relativism set standards by importing values "by force." For in-
stance, Brummett (1976), supra note 18, at 34, seems to suggest that one simply "count."
The greater the number of "significant others" who agree with a proposition, the truer that
proposition is. Elsewhere, Brummett borrows a concept from W.C. Booth, "Self as a Field of
Selves." Brummett (1981), supra note 18, at 296-98. According to this conception, people
are a product of members of their communities. Thus, despite a proclaimed disassociation
from one's community, "membership in the community is durable; it cannot be willed
away." Id. at 297.
Other techniques of justifying decisions, despite the relativistic impossibility of ground-
ing them in anything but agreement, result in similar "importations of ethical standards by
force," guidelines by which one can justify choosing one option over another, accepting one
"truth" instead of another. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 18, at 84-87. The problem with this is
always the same. If no standards can be universal, none of these responses to the dilemma
are justifications; they are simply the preferences of their originators. And again, why these
standards and not others?
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ing individuals within a culture. One need not tolerate all individ-
ual standards of behavior; one need only tolerate the dominant
order of a culture, the interests and understandings of those in
power. Differences within a culture need not necessarily be toler-
ated; differences between cultures must be tolerated, but only
when those differences do not go beyond certain unstated limits.
Perhaps the relativists claim to have made some discovery
concerning the truth about the world community; what is tolerated
by a given culture must be tolerated by the other cultures within
the world community. However, as has been shown to be the case,
only some cultures within the universe of possible cultures in a
world community need be tolerated. Presumably, where deviant in-
dividuals seek to transform the dominant order of culture in ways
congruent with the relativists' conceptions of desirable cultures,
the deviants will be supported by the relativists. Similarly, in those
instances where the internal transformers seek ends that do not fit
within the relativists' parameters of proper behavior in the world
community, no such toleration or support is warranted.,"
In light of other relativist theories and practices, taking rela-
tivist distinctions between cultural and individual relativism seri-
ously does nothing to eliminate its difficulties. Instead, the distinc-
tion raises serious issues as to how one recognizes and defines a
culture or the distinctions between cultures. Is a commune situated
in a New York forest'another culture to be treated according to the
so-called standards of cultural relativism, or is it merely part of the
dominant culture subject to the dominant rules of fact and value?
The same question can be asked of a neighborhood,, a religious
community, or any group identified as such either by themselves or
others. The relativists' distinction between cultural and individual
relativism cannot be taken literally, for to do so renders its doc-
trine even more incomprehensible. To do otherwise, that is to elim-
inate the distinction between cultural and individual relativism, re-
58. It has been argued that the practical application of cultural relativism calls not for
tolerance but for respect; we need not permit practices, we need only respect cultural differ-
ences. See S. MOSER, supra note 50, at 186. Such a position is of no practical significance.
One might respect a culture's ways and still forcibly impose upon that culture the ways of
another. In what sense can the relativist be respecting the different ways of another culture?
Rather than "respect," a better phrase might be "one ought to be aware of the differences
between and among cultures." Once again, however, if awareness does not lead to a practice




sults in the transformation of relativist doctrine into an argument
for anarchy-all positions and practices are to be tolerated, since
there is no way of judging any of them. The latter option is clearly
not the course chosen by the cultural relativists. The former-the
acceptance of such a distinction-points in the direction of
politics.
III. THE POLITICS OF RELATIVISM
How then can cultural relativism be understood? What is it?
Surely it is something, even though it is not what its adherents
purport it to be. The practices of certain cultures are tolerated
while those of others are not. Distinctions are drawn between one
culture and another, between one practice and another, that seem
to require internal contradictions in the relativist position.
One answer, and I think a correct one, is that cultural relativ-
ism is a function and a creation of relationships of power-that is
to say, politics. The lines drawn by the relativists are not drawn
randomly. The distinctions made are not without order. Choices to
support and respect some cultures and not others are made in the
service of interests. Sometimes the interest served is self-preserva-
tion; the practices of a particular culture threaten another culture's
survival, making intolerance the adopted strategy. Often the inter-
ests served are more particular.
It is my intention to illustrate this point; to demonstrate by
way of a particular example the political nature of relativist rheto-
ric and practice; to argue that cultural relativism, like any other
doctrine of method, philosophy, or practice is alternatively relied
upon and ignored as a function of the power and interests of its
proponents. As such, cultural relativism, as articulated, supported,
and practiced, is more accurately understood not as pure and un-
fettered scientific discourse used to guide the enlightened toward
the "truth" (or lack thereof) of humanity, but as a point of view, a
mechanism employed in a value-laden, political process, serving
the interests of some in accord with relationships (or desired rela-
tionships) of power.
IV. THE PARTICULAR CASE OF NATIVE AMERICAN EDUCATION
When viewed in their most favorable light, Euro-American
policies toward Native Americans from the outset have been cre-
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ated to assimilate the American Indian into Euro-American soci-
ety59 Viewed in a less favorable light-the light most probably
adopted by the majority of remaining traditional American Indi-
ans-the past four hundred years of Euro-American policy toward
the Indian has been a history of one attempt after another to elim-
inate the Indian culture, and with that, to eliminate Indian owner-
ship of vast quantities of land, an obstacle to the expansion of the
dominant culture.
One of the many tools of assimilation was and continues to be
education. Education has been touted as a means of emancipating
"the Indian child from his home, his parents, his extended family,
and his cultural heritage. It was in effect an attempt to wash the
'savage habits' and 'tribal ethic' out of the child's mind and substi-
tute a white middle-class value system in its place." 60
According to the rhetoric of politicians and scholars of Euro-
American Indian education policy, the past four hundred years of
Indian education have been an utter failure.6e Poverty, poor
health, unemployment, and high rates of alcoholism are prevalent
among Indian adults. As will be demonstrated, however, these con-
ditions do not necessarily indicate failure. Indians now demand
much that not long ago was being forced upon them by the De-
partment of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Surveying Indian education policy from its unofficial inception
in 156862 to the present, one can point to events that stand out as
59. To treat the topic of Native American education as a single issue, as if the designa-
tion "Native American" reflects the thoughts and lifestyles of the Indians, places in a ques-
tionable light any information and insights that follow. From the point of view of the indi-
vidual tribes, the term Native American reflects a white man's understanding of the world.
Each tribe considers itself a distinct group, united with others in efforts against a common
enemy, the dominant Euro-American culture. The point of this Article is not to lend
credence to such an analytical homogenization of the Native American. However, the topic
to be dealt with is not the detailed history of Native American eduction. Rather, my concern
is with the manner in which this topic has been understood and dealt with by white men. It
is not my intention that the reader walk away with the idea that all Indians are alike. To do
so would be a mistake.
For a thorough history of American Indian education, see M. SzAsz, EDUCATION AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN (1977).
60. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INDIAN EDUC., SEN. COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, IN-
DIAN EDuc.: A NATIONAL TRAoEDY-A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S. REP. No. 501, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 106 (1969) [hereinafter Sutcomm. REP.].
61. See generally id.
62. See Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, 25 STAN. L. REv. 489, 492
(1973); Sutcomm. REP., supra note 60, at 140-41; B. BERRY, THE EDUCATION OF AMERICAN
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instances of decisions regarding Indian education policy which de-
pended upon the outcome of debates between adherents to ethno-
centric opinions on the one hand and relativistic opinions on the
other. Perhaps with respect to no other issues (with the possible
exceptions of health policy and religious tolerance) can the "two
sides" be seen as clearly as they can when one looks at how it is
that a dominant culture educates another with which it comes into
contact. At the same time, by examining how one culture chooses
to educate another, the clear distinction between ethnocentrism
and relativism begins to blur. The two sides are indeed sides, but
are not divided along lines of some theoretical, intellectual contrast
of "isms." Viewed more closely, the sides are seen to be a contrast
between two strategies whose ultimate results (if not purposes) are
remarkably similar: both seek to transform a culture from what it
is to what it ought to be.
Euro-American policy toward the once indigenous peoples of
America can be divided into six periods, each beginning with some
event that has proven to be significant to the fate of Native Ameri-
cans. During each of these six periods, education policy toward Na-
tive Americans was made to fit the climate of the times.
A. The Mission Period (1568-1778): Unabashed Hubris
The first two hundred years of Native American education
consisted largely of efforts by the church to "civilize" and "Chris-
tianize" the "savages."6 s The first mission school was begun in
1568 by Jesuits who wanted to educate the Florida Indians. In ad-
dition to converting the Indians to Christianity, the Jesuits, most
of whom were French, were intent upon fulfilling the -wishes of
King Louis XIV who wanted the Indian children to be educated
"in the French manner."'" Anglicans and Franciscans, acting in ac-
cord with the wishes of their respective sovereigns, also opened
schools and colleges.6 5 Frequently, the schooling was extended
through what was supposed to be vacation periods by placing In-
dian children in the homes of local church-going citizens in an ef-
INDIANS: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., FINAL REP'T PREPARED FOR
THE SPEC. SUBCOMM. ON INDIAN EDUC. OF THE SEN. COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE 5
(Comm. Print 1968).
63. See SUBcoMM. REP., supra note 60, at 140-41; B. BERRY, supra note 62, at 7-9.
64. B. BERRY, supra note 62, at 7.
65. SuBComm. REP., supra note 60, at 10.
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fort to prevent the children from returning to their tribes and tri-
bal ways.
68
Throughout this period, the motives of the educators were
clear and unabashedly proclaimed. Whether it came from King
James, King Louis, religious leaders, or the Virginia Company, the
message was the same: eliminate the Indian way of life. The Indi-
ans were obstacles standing in the way of new territory, new land,
new riches. As with all obstacles, the solution to the problems
presented by the Indians lay in their elimination. Assimilation via
proper education was one technique used to accomplish the de-
sired end; it was by no means the only one. The Dutch in New
Amsterdam began paying bounties for Indian scalps in 1641:17
The general attitude of the Puritans toward the Indian is revealed by an inci-
dent in 1637 when the Pequot tribe resisted the migration of settlers into the
Connecticut Valley. A Pequot village was burned to the ground and 500 Indi-
ans were burned to death or shot while trying to escape. The surviving Pe-
quots were sold into slavery. The Puritans gave thanks unto the Lord that
they lost only two men, and Cotton Mather was grateful that 'on this day we
have sent 600 heathen souls to hell.'68
Throughout the entire mission period, the predominant view
was shaped by what we might call ethnocentrism. Euro-American
culture was felt to be superior to the relatively unclothed, un-
propertied life of the savages of the new world. There seem to be
almost no accounts of what, in hindsight, could be called the
"other side"-the right of the Indians to be Indians, to live as they
chose, to live according to their own ways. Criticisms of education
policy were not directed at the evils of basic ethnocentric assump-
tions of European superiority, but rather at the failure of the many
efforts to "educate."6 9 The concept of cultural relativism was not
66. Id. at 9.
67. B. BEREy, supra note 62, at 22, noted in Rosenfelt, supra note 62, at 492.
68. SuBcom. REP., supra note 60, at 142 (quoting P. FARB, MA'S RISE TO CIVILIZATION
247 (1968)). The two tactics--education and armed violence-have more in common than
the atrocities of the Puritans might suggest. It has been suggested by Foucault that Clause.
witz's aphorism that "war is politics continued by other means" is an inversion of the truth;
"politics is war continued by other means." Such an equation might just as easily be drawn
between the violent elimination of the "obstacle" with fire and bullets and the somewhat
less painful (to the flesh) violence done to a culture by the elimination of its children, its
future. See M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 45, at 78-108.
69. See generally SucoMM. REP., supra note 60, at 140-42; B. BERRY, supra note 62, at
7-9 & ch. II.
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yet a part of Euro-American cultural thought."0
B. The Treaty Period (1778-1871): The Hubris Continues
From its inception, United States federal policy toward Indian
education was shaped almost entirely by the country's desire for
Indian land. Whereas the rhetoric of the mission period spoke of
helping a culture, saving souls, and offering the benefits of civiliza-
tion to a world of savages, policy makers of the treaty period were
honest and direct in their expressed desire for Indian land and
their intention to use education as a tactic employed to accomplish
the desired end.
Specifically, the task of Indian education was to replace our
culture for theirs:
This was considered 'Advisable' as the cheapest and safest way of subduing
the Indians, of providing a safe habitat for the country's white inhabitants, of
helping the whites acquire desirable land, and of changing the Indian's econ-
omy so that he would be content with less land. Education was a weapon by
which these goals were to be accomplished.
71
The expressed justification for taking Indian land and sup-
planting their culture with the Euro-American culture was the in-
herent superiority of our way of life, our attitude toward produc-
tion and cultivation, as opposed to the Indian who, for the most
part, did nothing but live, hunt, and wander. Progress and civiliza-
tion demanded and justified the taking of Indian land by any
available means. Although important, education was by no means
70. In fact, only toward the end of the Mission Period did another side gain a
voice-and this was the voice of the Indians themselves. In one amusing exchange, Chiefs of
the Six Nations responded to an offer made by the Virginia Commissioners to educate six of
the chief's sons at a college in Williamsburg, Virginia.
Several of our young people were formerly brought up at colleges of the North-
ern Provinces: they were instructed in all your sciences; but when they came
back to us, they were bad runners; ignorant of every means of living in the
woods; unable to bear either cold or hunger; knew neither how to build a cabin,
take a deer, or kill an enemy; spoke our language imperfectly; were therefore
neither fit for hunters, warriors, or counselors; they were totally good for noth-
ing. We are however not the less obliged by your kind offer, though we decline
accepting it. And to show our grateful sense of it, if the gentlemen of Virginia
will send us a dozen of their sons, we will take great care of their education,
instruct them in all we know, and make men of them.
B. FRANKLIN, REMARKS CONCERNING THE SAVAGES OF AMRCA IN Two TRAcTs 28-29 (2d ed.
1794), quoted in SuscoMM. REP., supra note 60, at 140.
71. SuBcoMM. REP., supra note 60, at 142.
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the primary method by which Indian land was made available for
exploitation. Of equal if not more importance was force.
72
What role education did play was geared toward instructing
Indians in the ways of white men and women, specifically their re-
ligion, morality, and agriculture. By 1838, the government was op-
erating sixteen Indian manual labor schools (dubbed "agricultural
training schools") and eighty-seven boarding schools.7 3 There was
no pretense either by politicians or bureaucrats as to what was be-
ing done and why. Indian ways were to be eliminated. Indians who
happened to survive the brutality would (perhaps) be trained to
live as white men and women-poor white men and women. And
for the most part, this training was not expected to succeed. This
prevailing attitude during the period is perhaps best summed up in
the 1848 Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs, William Medill:
Stolid and unyielding in his ways, and inveterately wedded to the savage hab-
its, customs and prejudices in which he has been reared and trained, it is
seldom the case that the full blood Indian of our hemisphere can, in immedi-
ate juxtaposition with a white population, be brought farther within the pale
of civilization than to adopt its vices; under the corrupting influences of
which, too indolent to labor and too weak to resist, he soon sinks into misery
and despair. The inequality of his position in all that secures dignity and
respect, is too glaring, and the contest he has to make with the superior race
with which he is brought into contact... is too unequal to hope for a better
result.
While to all, the fate of the redman has, thus far been alike unsatisfac-
tory and painful, it has with many been a source of much misrepresentation
and unjust national reproach. Apathy, barbarism, and heathenism must give
way to energy, civilization, and Christianity. . . . If, in the rapid spread of
our population and sway, with all their advantages to ourselves and to others,
injury has been inflicted upon the barbarous and heathen people we have
displaced, are we as a nation to be held up to reproach for such a result."'
72. This Article does not provide a detailed account of Indian history. Every "Ameri-
can" in any way proud of his heritage ought to read the history of this period. The atrocities
perpetrated against the American Indian by order of the highest offices in the government
are, at the very least, instructive. See, e.g., A. DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1970); J. WISz, RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA (V. Deloria ed. 1971).
73. SuBcomm. REP., supra note 60, at 146.
74. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1848 ANNUAL REPORT 391 (1849), quoted in SUBCO1M.
REP., supra note 60, at 144. Medill was the first Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to be appointed almost solely as a political favor. President James Polk succumbed
to pressure by Ohio Democrats and appointed the then Second Assistant Postmaster Gen-
eral to the post in 1845. He served in this capacity until 1849, when Zachary Taylor was
elected president. During his four year term as Commissioner, Medill gained some notoriety
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Indian education during the treaty period was simply the im-
position of a rigid and mechanical order, the white man's order, on
Native Americans removed from their homes and cultural ways.
Once again, as during the mission period, policy was shaped by the
prevailing cultural attitude of superiority. Relativism still had no
place in the mind of America.
C. The Era of Allotment and Assimilation (1871-1928)
In 1871 Congress ended the period of treaty making with the
Indians, and in 1887 passed the General Allotment Act"8 which
provided the spine of what would be federal Indian policy until
1928. The Allotment Act was to become the next step in a long line
of efforts by the federal government to acquire Indian land. It pro-
vided for the parceling out of allotments of land to individual Indi-
ans-160 acres to each family head, 80 acres to each single person
over eighteen and to each orphan under eighteen, and 40 acres to
each other single person under eighteen. 7 The purpose and effect
of the Act was to reduce substantially the Indian land base. Over a
forty-year period, the Indian tribal economic base was reduced
from 140 million acres to approximately 50 million acres, 30 mil-
lion of which were severely or critically eroded.7 The proceeds
gained from any use or sale of the 90 million non-Indian-held acres
was to go into a trust, the proceeds of which were to be used to
fund Indian education.79
Native American education at this time was being modeled af-
ter the newly created Carlisle Indian Boarding School, the
brainchild of its first superintendent, an officer in the military,
Captain R. H. Pratt. Pratt's views on Indians were no secret: "[A]
for promoting Indian education. From this author's perspective, such notoriety is laughable
in light of his 1848 report. See R. Trennent, William Medill, in Tia CoMIsssIONRms oF
INDIAN AFFAIRS 29-39 (R. Kvasnicka & H. Viola eds. 1979).
75. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976).
76. See id. §§ 331-358.
77. Otis, History of the Allotment Policy, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before
the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 428-89 (1934), quoted in
D. GErcHEs, D. ROSENFELT & C. WLKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
69 (1979) [hereinafter GE'rcHs].
78. For more detail, see Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 16-18 (1934) (memorandum of J. Collier, Comm'r of
Indian Affairs); GErcEs, supra note 77, at 73-75. See also Suncomm. REP., supra note 60, at
12 (describing aridity of 20 million acres of desert land).
79. SuECOMM. REP., supra note 60, at 12.
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great general had said that the only good Indian is a dead one...
I agree with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian
there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him and save
the man."80 The goal of education quite clearly was to "kill the
Indian in the person" as rapidly as possible.8" This meant separat-
ing children from their reservation and family, stripping them of
tribal lore and mores, eliminating their use of their native lan-
guage, and bringing them to despise everything about themselves
that even suggested their heritage.
8 2
The Carlisle school served as a model for many boarding
schools founded during this period.83 The school's building was an
old army barracks. Pratt insisted upon the imposition of rigid mili-
tary discipline.8 4 Much of what passed for education during this
period amounted to the use of Indian children as laborers to sup-
port a poorly equipped and inadequately staffed government insti-
tution-the school itself.8 5 It seems to have been of little or no con-
cern that Indian children, abused for many years at boarding
schools, finished their education fit for neither Indian nor white
societies; they floundered in a place between their native culture,
of which they had never quite become a part, and the military fac-
simile of white culture imposed upon them during their school
years.
It was no secret during the Allotment Period that the purpose
of the government's efforts was to acquire Indian land. Education
was one means of effectuating this underlying policy goal. It is pos-
sible that much of what passed for sound educational policy was
motivated by the conscientious belief that what was indeed needed
was to "kill the Indian in the Indian."
Whatever good intentions may have existed, they hardly justi-
fied the tactics used to compel school attendance. Parents and tri-
bal elders understood that the new techniques of education were
assaults by the dominant culture upon Native American existence
and heritage as well as their future, and resisted by refusing to
80. Pratt, Th Advantage of Mingling Indians with Whites, in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 260, 261 (F. Prucha ed. 1973).
81. See R.H. PRATT, BATTLEFIELD AND CLASSROOM (R. Utley ed. 1964).
82. See SUBCoMM. REP., supra note 60, at 148; see generally R.H. PRATT, supra note 81.
83. SuBCOMM. REP., supra note 60, at 147.
84. Id. at 148; see generally R.H. PRATT, supra note 81, at ch. 21 (describing the mar-
tial discipline at the Carlisle school).
85. SUBCOMm. REP., supra note 60, at 148.
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send their children to the "culture killing" schools.8 6 The "well-
intentioned" dominant culture responded to this defiance with a
federal statute that authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
withhold food, "clothing and other annuities from Indian parents
or guardians who refused or neglected to send and keep their chil-
dren of proper school age in some school a reasonable portion of
the year.
87
It is clear that the concern for educating Indian children was
more a concern for destroying an "inferior" culture whose exis-
tence presented an obstacle than for providing Indians with the
opportunities offered by civilization, as many of the "well-inten-
tioned" claimed. Congressional mandate insisted upon the educa-
tion of all Indian children.8 8 Children were sent to schools in other
states without parental consent in order to fill the schools to ca-
pacity.8 9 Schools were horribly overcrowded with enrollments well
beyond what the facilities would reasonably allow. 0 Most students
were required to labor solely to support the overtaxed facilities.9 1
The "education" received by school children was wholly inade-
quate in terms of its content, and surely would not have been im-
posed on the majority of white children.2 However, the form of the
education was radically non-Indian and nontribal, and as such was
precisely what policy makers desired. Allotment practices and the
education meted out during this period were resounding suc-
cesses-the Indian within the Indian suffered tremendous harm.
D. The Meriam Report and Indian Reorganization (1928-1945):
The Disguise Begins
The first half of the twentieth century witnessed the rise to
prominence of cultural relativism in academic and practical an-
thropological circles. It was precisely in response to the same sorts
of ethnocentric notions that spawned the first 350 years of Euro-
American education policy toward the Indians that cultural rela-
86. Id. at 151.
87. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 635.





92. Id. at 146-52; R.H. PRA r, supra note 81, at 282-83.
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tivism emerged. Native American culture and the lives of the ma-
jority of Indians were in ruins. Their lands were largely gone, tribal
culture and coherence had been damaged severely by the forced
removal of children and the coercive tactics used to prevent the
practice of cultural rites and ceremonies.
According to many students of the United States policy to-
ward Native Americans, 3 this condition and the tactics that
brought it about likely would have persisted until all that was In-
dian had finally died were it not for the publication of The Prob-
lem of Indian Administration94 -better known as The Meriam Re-
port, after its primary author, Lewis Meriam. The report described
in detail the horror of the preceding centuries and the then-pre-
sent conditions under which the Indians were forced to live.
Although drawing causal connections between historical events
is problematic, many historians suggest that the period of Indian
reorganization was largely a consequence of the publication of The
Meriam Report. 5 The time for relativistic, tolerant understanding
of other cultures had come; the recommendations made by Meriam
caught on. The result was the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,6
and the appointment of the almost legendary John Collier as the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.9
According to most versions of the reorganization period, the
policies of the past 350 years changed radically under the leader-
ship of Collier and his legal aid, Felix Cohen.98 Native Americans
no longer were excluded from the management of their own affairs,
nor would the Bureau of Indian Affairs any longer tolerate the pro-
vision of inadequate (by white standards) services-especially
health and education-to the Indians.99
93. See generally M. SZASZ, supra note 59; V. DELonrA JR. & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDI-
ANs, AMERICAN JUSTICE 12 (1983).
94. L. MERAM, R. BROWN, H. CLOUD, E. DALE, E. DUKE, H. EDWARDS, F. MCKENZIE, M.
MARK, W. RYAN & W. SPILLMAN, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928) [hereinaf-
ter MERIAM].
95. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. REP., supra note 60, at 12-13, 152-56; B. BERRY, supra note 62,
at 19; M. SzAsz, supra note 59, at 16-36; E. ADAMS, AMERICAN INDIAN EDUCATION: GOVERN-
MENT SCHOOLS AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 68-74 (1976).
96. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976).
97. John Collier became Commissioner of Indian Affairs on April 21, 1933, and held the
office until 1945. SUBCOMM. REP., supra note 60, at 154.
98. Felix Cohen was the author of the classic treatise on Indian rights, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942).
99. See generally SUBCOMM. REP., supra note 60, at 152-56.
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By 1944, sixteen boarding schools were closed (including Car-
lisle school) and eighty-four day schools were opened.100 However,
the number of schools was not the measure by which Collier and
his newly appointed education director, Willard Beatty, measured
success; the nature and quality of that education was considered
just as important. Both Collier and Beatty were impressed with
the then-popular Progressive Education Movement,110 and both
recognized that anthropology-particularly the increasingly popu-
lar relativist anthropology-could be a valuable aid in understand-
ing Indian cultures. 10 2 Collier hired anthropologists to work for the
Indian Service and established long-lasting ties with anthropologi-
cal and ethnological associations as well as with the Progressive
Education Association.103 The result of these influences was an at-
tempt to make Indian education relevant to the lives of the Indi-
ans. The absurdity of taking children from nomadic cultures and
teaching them to read the white middle-class stories of "Dick and
Jane" was clear. The Indian family and social structure, according
to the policy makers of that day, must be strengthened and sup-
ported. The family and tribal group identity were to become con-
siderations, incorporated into the decisions made regarding the
shape of education. Only in this way could the Indian Federal
School System become "successful," a model of excellence.
The educational reforms of the reorganization period are con-
sidered almost universally as resounding successes and perhaps the
epitome of the successful implementation into practice of the prin-
ciples of cultural relativism.' 0 ' One could not hope for a more para-
digmatic instance of cross-cultural practice ostensibly shaped by a
respect for the ways of a foreign culture. Indians were encouraged
to take part in shaping their own future. The practices of the Reor-
ganization Period differed tremendously from the practices that
preceded. The methods used to "kill the Indian within the Indian"
prior to Meriam, Collier, Beatty and their anthropologically en-
lightened planners and educators were brutal and cruel; the coer-
cive threat of the federal sovereign had been violent and effective.
However, when these threats were stopped, what took their place
100. Id. at 13, 156; Brightman, Mental Genocide, 7 IEQuALrrY iN EDUC. 17 (1971).
101. M. SzAsz, supra note 59, at chs. 4, 7.
102. Id. at 50-55.
103. Id. at ch. 5.
104. SuBCOMM. REP., supra note 60, at 152-56.
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was no less value-laden, no less directed at accomplishing the goals
of the dominant culture than were the violent policies that had
come before.
The point of Native American education during the Reorgani-
zation Period was not to revive the Indian ways of the past.
Neither Collier nor his anthropological trouble-shooters measured
the success of their programs by the degree to which Indian senti-
ment resembled the sentiment expressed by the Chiefs of the Six
Nations in response to the white man's offer to educate their chil-
dren.105 What counted as successful education policy was that
which resulted in voluntary school attendance, success in scholastic
performance, economic progress within the Indian community, and
the reduction of poverty, disease, and the poor standards of liv-
ing-all measured by white standards. The Collier administration
did not want a return to Indian tribalism of the kind that had
spurred the uprisings and wars of the centuries before.10
This return to tribalism was not likely. Through one creative
atrocity after the next, the Indian nations had been starved,
beaten, tortured, healed, and educated into despair and depen-
dency; armed rebellion was all but impossible. The past 350 years
had seen Euro-American culture and policy "jammed down the
throats" of Native Americans. Now that it looked as if nothing
could be done to reverse the acculturation, it was the task of the
Collier administration to make quasi-Euro-Americanism palatable.
What better way to complete the process of acculturation than to
convince one's victims that their new way of life is freely chosen, a
product of their own self-government.
This certainly was the case in education. Native American
adults who had grown up during the Allotment Period, educated in
boarding schools and their on-reservation facsimiles, were en-
couraged to help shape education policy. 7 The goal was not to
105. See supra note 70.
106. There is much evidence that Collier in fact did want to revive tribalism and the
communal ways of the past. See, e.g., K. PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN RE-
FORM 161-86 (1977). Indeed, for the most part, that is his reputation. There is also evidence
to support an opposite conclusion. Throughout the controversy over the proposed Indian
Reform Act, "Collier and his aides attempted to reassure skeptics that the ultimate goal of
assimilation was not being abandoned"-that the full assimilation would still take place, but
would take a longer time. G. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN T=IALISM 23
(1980).
107. In fact, community involvement in shaping policy was said to be central to virtu.
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revive ways of life and understanding that were nearly dead, but to
enable the "benefits of civilization" to be visited upon the Indian
in ways less distasteful to white and Indian alike.
A look at the primary innovation in education implemented
during the Collier years-achievement tests-goes a long way to-
ward explaining the intent of the reorganization educators. The
Meriam Report made the following criticisms of federal Indian
policy prior to 1928: "In the Indian schools not even the most ele-
mentary use has been made of either intelligence testing or objec-
tive tests of achievement in the types of knowledge and skills that
are usually referred to as the 'regular school subjects.' "1 Accord-
ing to one report concerning the effect The Meriam Report had
upon Indian education, "[n]ever ha[d] a critical remark been taken
more seriously, for in the 40 years since the publication of that
report, no aspect of Indian education ha[d] received more atten-
tion from researchers than ha[d] achievement testing."10 9
Since The Meriam Report, and starting with the Collier ad-
ministration, literally thousands of studies have been published
wherein the authors report the progress (or lack thereof) of Native
American education based upon the results of I.Q. and achieve-
ment tests.110 The point of all these was to measure how well the
Indian Service was training Indians to accomplish scholastically
whatever it was their white counterparts could accomplish. To
those at the Service, doing a good job of educating Indians was
understood as assuring Indians and whites alike that Indian chil-
dren were doing just as well as white children. The standard, the
norm, was a white norm.
The use of progressive educational techniques and the incor-
poration of contemporary understandings of anthropology were
dramatic changes in the means by which the goal would be accom-
plished. The goal, however, remained the same; the existence of
Indian culture must no longer fall as a burden on the shoulders of
members of the dominant culture. Practices shaped and supported
by relativistic attitudes were tactics, employed to accomplish val-
ally all reorganization policies. See SUBCOMM. REP., supra note 60, at 152-56; see also Com-
ment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 955 (1972).
108. MERIAM, supra note 94, at 380.
109. B. BERRY, supra note 62, at 19.
110. Id. at 18-24.
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ued interests; specifically, they made sure the Native Americans
could function in the new world, the white man's world.""
Cultural relativism, a guiding force throughout the Collier
term of office, was not the theoretically pure position postulated by
Lowie, Herskovits, and others. It was a politically advantageous
tactic, humanitarian enough to capture the public imagination of
the times. Indian culture was given a voice only when its voice was
in tune with the voice of the dominant culture. Cultural relativism
was a practice whose time had come, and it would last as long as it
served the purposes for which it was adopted.
E. The Termination Period (1945-1961): A Return to the Bad
Old Days
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, friction between Collier
and the Senate and House Indian Affairs Committee increased.
Three concerns most often were discussed by the Committee as be-
ing problems with the Collier policies of cross-cultural education
and Indian self-government: (1) the existence of large amounts of
Indian land that remained inaccessible for exploration by the
members of the dominant culture; (2) communist tendencies inher-
ent in Indian culture; and (3) the large expenditures that the fed-
eral government was forced to make in order to support the Indian
111. During the House hearings on the Indian Reorganization Act, Collier testified:
[U]nder the operation of the self-government features of the bill. . . many of
the things the government is now doing through paid employees would pass over
to individual communities, by cooperative voluntary effort.
Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 69
(1934), quoted in G. TAYLOR, supra note 106, at 23.
In light of this and similar statements as well as the policies implemented during his
administration, it might be suggested that Collier was not a relativist. Evidence suggests
that Collier, at times, was anything but a relativist, making statements to the effect that the
tribal ways of the Indians were preferable to the strident individualism of the white culture.
See K. PHILP, supra note 106, at 161, 162.
Whether or not Collier himself was relativistic in his understanding of the ways of Na-
tive Americans is not the issue. The point is that relativism became a tactic used to accom-
plish ends, whether its proponents were believers or not. It might be suggested that the
reliance on relativist doctrine and beliefs as a post hoc rationalization for actions is very
different from the implementation of policies because of one's belief in relativist doctrine.
To be sure, these are different. However, that difference is in no way instructive to the
thesis presented here. Relativist doctrine is always a rationalization, whether it is truly
believed or not. What always lies deeper than any rationalization are the interests served,
both by the chosen rationalization and the actions that precede.
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aid programs. 112 Throughout the early 1940s, the educational em-
phasis was shifting from what was being called "cross-cultural edu-
cation," which took into account both Indian and white values and
lifestyles, to vocational education, designed to prepare Native
Americans for the changing urban industrial job market.113 This is
not to say that what had preceded-cross cultural education-ever
had been devised in order to preserve or represent traditional Na-
tive American ways. It is the thesis of this Article that the relativ-
istic considerations and policies of the Collier administration were
tactics, albeit (perhaps) unconscious tactics, employed to further
the infusion of Euro-American norms, values, and ways of under-
standing the world into Native American culture. The shift in the
techniques of education that took place during the 1940s stands as
another example of how Collier's policies were relativistic and
cross-culturally oriented when such a posture suited the goals,
standards, and needs of the dominant white culture. When it be-
came the case that culturally sensitive education was no longer ec-
onomically rational, nor the tactic most advantageous for the dom-
inant culture, emphasis shifted accordingly. Here, the shift to
vocational education reflected the change in the economic situation
of the country as understood by experts of the dominant white
culture.
Collier's policies were changing. However, the antagonistic
forces could not wait for the slow economic and anglicizing pro-
gress that Collier promised. In 1944, the House Select Committee
to Investigate Indian Affairs and Conditions made recommenda-
tions for achieving a "final solution to the Indian problem." 14 Ac-
cording to the Committee, one problem with reorganization poli-
cies was their "tendency ... to 'adapt the education to the Indian
and to his reservation way of life' rather than to 'adapt the Indian
to the habits and requirements he must develop to succeed as an
112. See L. TYLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: A WORKPAPER ON THE TERMINATIONS WITH AN AT-
TEMPT TO SHOW ITS ANTECEDENTS 22 (1964). The economy was suddenly changing. Large
numbers of Indian males who had entered military service were coming back in the late
1940s and settling in cities, not on the reservations. The Indian communities were shifting
again due to Anglo activities-and again the Indians were forced to adjust.
113. SuncoMM. REP., supra note 60, at 156-57; M. SzAsz, supra note 59, ch. 9.
114. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE INDIAN AFFAIRS & CONDITIONS IN




independent citizen earning his own way off the reservation.' "115
Perhaps the Committee failed to see that Collier's programs were
designed to do largely this. Perhaps the Committee members were
impatient for an end to the Indian problem; the country was at
war and Congress was less and less willing to spend large amounts
of money to aid a group of people who offered little in the way of
support for the war effort. Another possibility-plausible, although
not strongly supported by available evidence-is that although
progress was being made, certain interested organizations, individ-
uals, and concerns wanted Indian land for exploitation and did not
want to risk the possibility that, once assimilated, Indians would
themselves use and develop their vast resources and landbase for
their own advantage. Perhaps all of this played a role in shaping
Congress' decision to reshape United States policies toward the
Indian.
Whatever the stated reasons, real progress was demanded, a
real progress that would come about by "de-Indianizing" the Indi-
ans, making them better American citizens, not better Indians.
Day schools were criticized as inferior to boarding schools. 1 At-
tending day school enabled Indian children to return each day to
the few remaining influences of tribal ways, whereas attending
boarding schools permitted the radical cessation of contact with
anything Indian. Culturally sensitive education could not be per-
mitted to stand in the way of successful assimilation.
Collier resigned in 1945 and was replaced by William Brophy,
who, during his confirmation hearings, assured senators that he
would act in accord with Congress' wishes.~11 Congress' wishes were
quite clear-prepare Indians for the termination of federal ser-
vices. Budget cuts continued throughout the 1940s and 1950s.11
Dillon Meyer, the former director of the World War II program to
relocate Japanese-Americans after they had been moved to intern-
ment camps, was appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs in
1950, and did his best to effectuate the revived pre-Collier policy
of obviously coercive assimilation of the American Indian into the
115. Id. at 8.
116. See SUBCOMM. REP., supra note 60, at 13-14, 156-61.
117. Id. at 158.





By 1953 the legislative basis for termination of tribal existence
was in place with the passage of Public Law 280,120 which trans-
ferred federal criminal and civil jurisdiction to individual state
governments, and House Resolution 108,121 which called for the
end of federal services to Indians.122 The revitalization of the
boarding schools and relocation programs continued, as did the
elimination of day schools. Large numbers of students simply were
shipped to out-of-state boarding schools,123 the purpose, once
again, to "kill the Indian in the Indian."
From the point of view of the dominant culture, the first four
centuries of United States policies toward Native Americans had
been successful. For almost four hundred years, the now dominant
Euro-American culture had forced its ways onto the "inferior" Na-
tive Americans. Much of this had been accomplished violently; the
severe punishment of those Indians who remained "Indian" had
been commonplace. Some of the policies adopted were less obvi-
ously coercive, but nonetheless manipulative. However, the goal
had remained the same; assimilation of the Indian until the exis-
tence of the Indian no longer presented an obstacle to the inten-
tions and desires of the dominant culture. The techniques em-
ployed and policies adopted to effectuate that goal changed in
accordance with the political realities of the times. When ethno-
centric, absolutist rhetoric was advantageous, the policies fol-
lowed-military boarding schools, allotment, starvation, and the
like-reflected this. When a "more humanitarian" posture held the
public and political favor, relativistic tolerance of the ways of an-
other culture was wedded to Indian policy. The goal never
changed. Termination was simply the next step in the long line of
policies and practices designed to accomplish that goal.
The effects of pursuing this goal were profound:
In 1961 when President John F. Kennedy's Administration took office, the
Indians of the United States were confused, disoriented, and filled with anxi-
ety and worry. Considerable progress had been made under the enlightened
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which bringing to an end the long and
Indian-impoverishing allotment policy, encouraged tribal self-government,
119. SuscoMM. REP., supra note 60, at 161-64; M. SZASZ, supra note 59, at 121-22.
120. 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982)).
121. H. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. 132 (1953).
122. SuBcomm. REP., supra note 60, at 14.
123. Id. at 12-13 (discussion of "de-Indianizing the Indian"), 160-62.
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extended a minimum of financial credit to the tribes, commenced an im-
provement in the Indians's economies, and educational and health facilities,
restored certain freedoms to the Indians, promoted a revival of their cultures
and therefore, of pride in themselves. In 1953 with the [implementation of
the Termination Policies and passage of several termination acts] its progress
had been sharply halted.. . . All tribes felt the threat and became immobi-
lized; ready or not they faced the prospect of being turned over to the states,
most, if not all, of which could not or would not assume the services, protec-
tive responsibilities and other obligations which the federal government had
originally assumed by treaties and various agreements in the past which the
tribes still urgently required.
124
The termination or threatened termination of services created
what many have called "termination psychosis ' 12 and a general-
ized distrust for all government policies. The process of assimila-
tion had come quite far. Indians now were worried that the govern-
ment would stop all those services which the Indians had resisted
for years. Indians finally had become so dependent upon the ways
of the dominant culture that they feared their elimination. The
only desired end that had not yet come about was the complete
elimination of the identifying category, Indian.
F. The Period of "Self-determination" (1961-present): The Dis-
guise Resumes
Although the year 1961 is usually considered the beginning of
the present era of Indian self-determination, official pronounce-
ments against the policy of termination began to be heard as early
as 1958. The first of these came from Interior Secretary Seaton,
who in 1958 stated that termination without tribal consent was
"unthinkable. ' 126 In 1961, Interior Secretary Udall's Task Force
Report on the effects of termination and status of the Indians was
published.1 27 The report recommended that termination policies be
ended, and that the government shift their focus of concern toward
economic development on the reservation.
Throughout the 1960s, the Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions introduced numerous social programs for Indian reservations.
124. A. Josephy, The American Indian and the Bureau of Indian Affairs--1969: A
Study, with Recommendations (unpublished manuscript), quoted in SuBcoMM. REP., supra
note 60, at 165.
125. See A. Josephy, supra note 124, quoted in SUBcoMM. REP., supra note 60, at 14.
126. GETcHEs, supra note 77, at 106.
127. SUBCOMM. REP., supra note 60, at 15, 168.
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One of the most significant developments was the initiation of over
sixty "Community Action Programs" through which Indians were
trained and given the opportunity to begin to take part in manag-
ing the services and activities provided to their communities.128
What generally is considered the most significant experiment
in Indian education was the establishment in 1966 of the Rough
Rock Demonstration School on the Navaho Reservation.129 Inter-
ested outsiders and education experts 130 convinced the Bureau of
Indian Affairs that what was needed in order to upgrade Indian
communities was to provide for education of students in their local
communities, rather than to send students to a distant school. In
addition, the experts claimed that a community school could only
be successful if the community members were allowed an active
role in its administration."1 In 1966, the Bureau and the Office of
Economic Opportunity contracted with Navaho leaders to allow lo-
cal control of the community school at Rough Rock.3 2
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed more of the same.133 The offi-
128. M. SZASZ, supra note 59, chs. 11-13.
129. Id. at ch. 13.
130. Most notable were Stanford Kravitz of the Office of Economic Opportunity's Com-
munity Action Program, and Dr. Robert Roessel, who became the school's first director.
131. M. SZASZ, supra note 59, ch. 13.
132. Four Rough Rock innovative policies were:
(1) Indian support for education was to be gained by involving adults in the
process of planning and controlling what was to be taught.
(2) English was to be taught as a second language, not something Indians
were supposed to learn by mere exposure.
(3) The school was not only to be charged with educating Indian children,
but with assisting in the development of the local communities by way of such
things as adult education programs.
(4) The school would attempt to transmit to the young people the culture of
their parents. Tribal elders would teach traditional materials.
Rough Rock, still in existence today, is run by a local five-member school board, and is still
committed to involving local Indians in their school.
133. There are numerous examples of Indian efforts to gain control of local schools. For
instance, the second of the modern Indian-controlled community schools began on the Nav-
aho reservation in 1969. Because of the closing of local public schools, the residents of the
Ramah Navaho community were confronted with the options of sending their children ei-
ther to consolidated high schools located 20 to 30 miles away, or to federal boarding schools.
The consolidated school option was eliminated when the school district determined that it
had insufficient funds to transport the residents of Ramah. Local residents decided to try to
open their own school. Private and federal funds (federal monies in the amount it would
cost to support Ramah children at federal boarding schools) made it possible for the local
community to operate a local private school for grades 7 through 12. For more on the
Ramah school and a treatment of the issue of community-controlled Indian schools, see
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cial United States policy was one of giving Indians control over
their own lives, activities, and communities."" Indian communities
continued to insist upon and gain control over their own schools.1 5
Communities demanded relevant education-programs that would
motivate students and effectively teach them the skills they would
need in order to handle the increasingly complex economic affairs
of the reservation and the outside world successfully. Although
boarding schools still existed (in almost as reprehensible a form as
they did during the days of allotment) the trend was changing;
they were being upgraded or phased out. 3'
In 1975, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Act,137 giving express authority to the appropriate cabi-
net heads to contract with and make grants to Indian tribes and
organizations for the delivery of federal services. In essence, the
Act is legal recognition of the stated policy of self-determination.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs has been slow to implement the Act,
but its provisions suggest what might be thought of as a dramatic
philosophical change toward the administration of Indian affairs:
"[T]ribal programs should be funded by the federal government,
but the programs should be planned and administered by the
tribes themselves; federal 'domination' should end."138
Present federal policy toward Native American education is as
relativistically grounded and culturally sensitive as were the poli-
cies of the Collier era of Indian reorganization. Policy makers and
experts speak of Indian controlled schools, Indian communities
shaping their institutions and futures, and Indian involvement and
management of reservation activities. One no longer hears many
politicians, bureaucrats, or concerned citizens talking about the
"inferior Indian culture," the "heathen savages," or the superiority
of their own culture. No one speaks of "killing the Indian in the
Indian," or claims that "the only good Indian is a dead Indian."
Rosenfelt, supra note 62, at 509-10, and M. SZASZ, supra note 59, at chs. 11-13.
134. The "definitive" self-determination statement was authored by President Richard
Nixon, who called for "self-determination without termination." See H.R. Doc. No. 363,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
135. See M. SzAsz, supra note 59, chs. 12-15; Rosenfelt, supra note 62, at 489.
136. Brightman, Mental Genocide: Some Notes on Federal Boarding Schools, 7 INE-
QUALITY IN EDUC. 15 (1971).
137. 25 U.S.C. §§ 13a, 450a-450n, 455-458e (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2004(b), 4762 (1976); 5
U.S.C. § 3371 (1976); 50 U.S.C. § 456 (1976).
138. GETCHxs, supra note 77, at 111.
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This is not due, however, to the enlightened mindset of our
politicians, bureaucrats, or academics; the philosophical changes, if
indeed there have been any, are far from dramatic. Indians need
no longer be dead to be good because many Indians (and certainly
those involved in internal Bureau of Indian Affairs politics) tend to
desire things that fit neatly into the dominant culture's world view.
The goal of Indian-controlled education is to prepare Indians to
better the life on the reservation; economic progress and resource
development are those things thought to be relevant to a better
life. Traditional Indian ways largely are gone. The sort of educa-
tion being demanded and shaped by Indians is not similar to the
education received by Indians living in traditional cultures; Indians
now learn facts about traditional ways. Indian schools do not edu-
cate children by providing them with traditional life experiences of
trees, animals, and the living forces of the world. Education takes
place in a school, an institution that meets certain requirements,
that prepares students to fit into the new world, that arms stu-
dents with the tools required to pass I.Q. and achievement tests
which measure abilities said to be necessary for success in the
dominant culture.
Why should the dominant culture care if Indians take charge
of their own education? Native Americans are willing now to do to
and for themselves what the ethnocentrically oriented policy plan-
ners of the past had to force upon their ancestors. Moreover, with
the willingness and cooperation of eager Indians, the process is far
more effective than it ever was.
Explaining the present federal Indian education policies as the
philosophy of cultural relativism put into practice is not incorrect.
However, in light of relevant historical and political realities, such
an explanation becomes meaningless. If Indian-controlled educa-
tion were suddenly to shift away from the white educational para-
digm, if education no longer were geared toward helping the Indian
progress economically, if school buildings and formal classes teach-
ing formal subjects were abandoned, if education consisted of
teaching guerilla techniques, rebellion, and the most effective ways
of destroying white property on Indian land, Indian self-determi-
nation and control of schools would no longer be the stated theme
guiding federal policy.
The fact that Indian schools allow tribal elders to teach
"traditional materials" does not negate the point. It simply sug-
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gests that whatever traditional materials are taught are not per-
ceived as a threat to the process of acculturation.'39 What counts
as traditional material being presented to students at Rough Rock
or any similar school in no way approaches what Indians had bat-
tled so fiercely to maintain.
On this point, it is instructive to view some of the educational
materials prepared in the 1960s and 1970s designed to train educa-
tors of Native American youths. Consider the following:
Understanding the culture of the Indian student will help you make the suit-
able rewards for achievement. The Indian wants to belong.. . . He does not
want to stand out from the group as an individual .... Point out how they
actually show their parents as inferior by their inability to speak English and
their keeping it to themselves.40
Educators and policy makers have prepared volume after volume
in order to help teachers use Native American cultural values to
promote the dominant culture's style of education. One author
urged teachers to impress upon students non-Indian values for
work, time, and saving. In praise of another educator he writes:
"He knew that unless these key attitudes, which are so important
for success in non-Indian society, were understood, the Indian peo-
ple could not become successful. '141 Noting further that young
children's attitudes can be changed easily, the author suggests les-
sons that might accomplish this.
Depending upon the age of the group, of course, various lectures can be given
to express this important concept [time]. Thus, for example, questions as to
what would happen if the sun forgot that it was time to warm the earth in
the summer, or the sheep forgot that it was time to give birth to little lambs,
or the rain forgot to fall so that things could grow, and things of this nature
can slowly produce a time orientation in the child.1
4 2
This attempt to "retool" Native American values "must be consist-
ently done throughout the child's experience in the school system.
139. In a recent interview with two Seneca Nation teenagers, I was told that traditional
material was considered boring and pointless by most students. At best it is seen as history.
I do not pretend that this counts as an exhaustive survey; at the same time, the two young
people were quite enthusiastic about the truth of their opinions regarding the overall view of
traditional materials held by their friends.
140. INDIAN EDuc. CENTER, COLLEGE OF EDUC., AIuz. STATE UNIV., KEYS TO INDIAN EDU-
CATION, 29-30 (E. Nix ed. 1962).
141. J. POWERS, BROTHERHOOD THROUGH EDUCATION: A GUIDE FOR TEACHERS OF AMERI-
CAN INDIANS 132 (1965) (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 133.
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Time can be related to the necessity for all of the elements of na-
ture to do their job properly (work)." 148
Throughout the policy and training books one finds reference
to respecting and enhancing Native American culture while giving
the children an understanding of the ability to succeed in a Euro-
American culture.144 However, it remains clear that value for pre-
serving Native American culture is not to take precedence over ed-
ucation, and education is learning Euro-American ways. The texts
speak for themselves:
A similar disproportion, danger, and future need, concerns the subject mat-
ters of the program improvements now being designed... . There are a num-
ber of important subjects which have scarcely been influences, such as the
natural sciences and mathematics. 45
Good attitudes toward the dominant culture and other cultures are essential
to the child's being able to do a good job of adjusting to a bi-cultural situa-
tion. The teacher-aide, representing the culture of the child, can help the
child do this better than can a teacher from the dominant culture. The pre-
school Indian child generally will identify with the aide and will realize that
the aide has travelled the same road.
46
NCC [Navajo Community College] exists to fulfill many needs of the Navajo
people .... In addition, it provides a good foundation for those interested in
the professions-such as law, teaching and medicine.1 47
Many Indian children do not comprehend adequately the intricacies of the
American economic system. Aside from the regular courses of study, an ac-
quaintance with the game Monopoly is an extremely educational device. This
game is learned in the classroom situation and when the children are adept at
the basic rules, the educator relates this knowledge of the game to the func-
tioning of the economic system .... Again, this must be carried on consist-
ently or the effect is likely to be lost.1 48
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., id. at 133-40; Exhibit VII-It Is Being Done: Hearings Before the Spe-
cial Subcomm. on Indian Educ. of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 90th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 5, 2055-70 (1969); C. STEErz, P. KuKuLsKi, A. KUKULSKI & J.
STEERE, INDIAN TEACHER-AIDE HANDBOOK 76-94 (1965) [hereinafter C. STEERE]; INDIAN EDUC.
RESEARCH CENTER, COLLEGE OF EDuc., ARIz. STATE UNIv., SixTH ANNuAL AMERIcAN INDIAN
EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE: THEME--UsE OF EDUCATIONAL WEAPONS IN THE WAR ON POVERTY
(1965); W. BASS & H. BURGER, AimucAN INDIANS AND EDUcATIONAL LABORATORIES, 21-25
(1967).
145. W. BASS & H. BURGER, supra note 144, at 19.
146. C. STzEE, supra note 144, at 94.
147. L. JONES, AMERIcAN INDIAN EDUCATION, 174 (1972), quoting 1971-72 NAVAJO COM-
MUNITY COLLEGE CATALOG 3 (1973) (emphasis added).
148. J. PowERs, supra note 141, at 133 (emphasis added).
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The socialization process becomes easier for the youngster when he is assisted
in learning how to perceive the expectancies of a new cultural environment as
well as the development of attitudes which are considered appropriate and
acceptable. If we can be alerted to the variations from which the child
comes, then we can endeavor to get into the frame of reference of the child
and understand the effect of his cultural orientation upon his readiness to
participate in the learning process.14
The cultural patterns and values of the Indian are changing in our world to-
day. The recognition of this fact makes it important for the educator to pre-
pare the older generation as well as the school-age group for the meaning
and effects of such an eventuality. The parents and leaders of these Indian
groups should be provided with the opportunity for gaining the information,
experiences, and skills necessary for adaptation and acceptance of change.
Trained school personnel can narrow the gap between the Indian parent and
the school through a knowledge of the Indian environment, values and cus-
toms, and in applying this understanding to the objectives being proposed
for the education of the Indian child."5"
The dominant white culture's tolerance is not a function of
our relativistic view of the world. Rather, it adopts a relativistic
posture because the "foreign" culture with which it is in contact no
longer offers a sufficient obstacle to our goals to warrant the adop-
tion of harsher, less tolerant postures. After four hundred years of
atrocities visited upon the Indians, the wants and desires of the
majority of members of both cultures are no longer in such opposi-
tion as to disturb the whites.151 Should that condition change-for
149. N. GREENBERG & G. GREENBERG, EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN TODAY'S
WORLD 32 (1964) (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 46 (emphasis added). See also THE INDIAN EDUC. CLEARINGHOUSE OF THE
CENTER FOR APPLIED LINGUISTICS, HANDBOOK FOR STAFF DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP IN INDIAN
EDUCATION (1976).
I have (perhaps) overstated my case-or so several traditionalist Native Americans with
whom I have spoken have tried to convince me. There is a growing "grass roots" movement
seeking federal and international recognition of sovereignty for indigenous peoples. These
groups indeed may have preserved (or regained) the cultural traditions of their ancestors.
However, the groups are not (yet) perceived as presenting a substantial threat to the status
quo. Federal and state governments will never agree to Native American "cession," and Na-
tive Americans certainly do not possess the military power to effectuate that end.
151. That such is the case can be seen in the areas where Indians and whites are in
conflict. The issues of fishing rights, water and mineral rights, and control of land contain-
ing vast quantities of resources whose exploitation has become economically feasible since
the cost of long-used sources of energy have greatly increased, all have become areas of
Indian/white and assimilated/traditional conflict in the past few years. It is my opinion that
if the non-Indian sources of needed resources were to become either economically or abso-
lutely inaccessible to those in the dominant culture, respect and tolerance for the existence
of Indian identity and Indian ownership would vanish.
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whatever reason-relativism as practice will again give way to the
most appropriate and expedient alternative tactic.152
CONCLUSION
Why it is that human cultures differ, one from another, re-
mains unanswered. Theories of cultural development differ almost
as much as do the cultures themselves. Prior to the early 1900s, the
field of anthropology viewed these differences from a position of
felt and articulated superiority. That which was not similar to the
ways of the anthropologists was adjudged inferior. This ethnocen-
tric attitude was relied upon to justify all sorts of actions directed
toward the "inferior." Each discovery of difference became another
feather in the cap of the West, every difference proving once again
the degree to which Euro-American ways were superior to others.
During the early 1900s all this began to change. Academics be-
gan to question their own and their predecessors' ethnocentrism.
Their culture had flaws that did damage to a belief in Western
superiority. Cultures came to be viewed in light of their particular
context and condition. Evaluation of one way of being vis-a-vis an-
other was no longer possible; the designation of good and bad was
idiosyncratic, a result of an acculturation process to which the
evaluator was subject. One way of being was neither better nor
worse, neither superior nor inferior to another.
The latter view, cultural relativism, has been adopted in one
form or another by most modern anthropologists. According to the
relativist position, one has no culturally free basis by which to
make an evaluation of another culture or its practices. Beliefs and
world views can be neither true nor correct, because all under-
standing is distorted by cultural assumptions. Truth-absolute
I am not alone in my beliefs. Conversations with traditional Indians and individuals as-
sociated with the Indian Law Resource Center share the belief that in many ways what is
currently being called the "energy crisis" presents Indian cultures with what is perhaps
their most severe threat since the arrival of the whites onto Indian land.
152. Although the thesis of this Article might seem overly conspiratorial in tone to
some, there are others who will read it as mild and understated-perhaps even another
"coverup" by a member of the dominant culture. Certain leaders in the cause of Indian
rights have rejected the notion that the United States' policies toward the Indians in general
and toward Indian education in particular were aimed unconsciously at assimilating Indians
even when the stated government goals were self-determination. Rather, they insist that this
end was never unconscious: that United States policy toward Native Americans has been a
clever and purposeful vacillation designed to gain the trust of and eliminate Indians.
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truth that transcends cultural boundaries-is no longer possible;
all statements of "truth" are relative.
Neither ethnocentrism nor cultural relativism present palat-
able philosophical or practical positions. On the one hand,
ethnocentrists tend to elevate their own ways of being in the world
to a preferred and privileged position, simply because they are
their own. That which is familiar and accepted is correct; differ-
ence is wrong or, perhaps, bad. One need not be tolerant of differ-
ence. Tolerance is a matter of grace; one is tolerant of difference
because one chooses to be. The ethnocentric individual professes
and represents the true, the good, the right.
On the other hand, relativism collapses under the weight of its
own words. The relativist rejects the possibility of recognizing the
true, the good, the right. One cannot condemn another culture's
beliefs or practices as being wrong or evil, because to do so would
suggest that one has a neutral place free from cultural bias upon
which to stand and correctly evaluate the world. If one asserts the
impossibility of knowing something for certain, there is likewise no
reason to accept as true that very assertion; relativism asserts as
truth that truth either cannot be known or does not exist. As such,
relativism enjoys no privileged position.
Herskovits, Lowie, Benedict and others claim that cultural rel-
ativism is viable as a method of inquiry, a philosophy derived from
that inquiry, and a practice grounded in that philosophy. Indeed,
cultural relativism is exalted to a position of one of the superlative
achievements of modern anthropology and social science. And yet,
relativism is never taken to the extremes implied by its words.
Self-described relativists draw practical lines beyond which they
will not go. Tolerance and respect, the practical relativists' codes,
go only so far. The relativist who will not tolerate the practices of
Nazi Germany refuses to do so either because Nazi practices are
wrong or because the relativist is afraid and knows no other course
of action. According to relativist doctrine, the former reason is sim-
ply a brand of practice motivated by enculturated, ethnocentric
beliefs and, therefore, wrong; the individual claims to be able to
recognize objective "wrong" from a culturally biased position. The
latter is no position whatever; it is simply a reaction to fear, born
of ignorance. 15
3
153. Ignorant does not necessarily mean incorrect, but merely without understanding.
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The doetrine of relativism is not coherent on its own terms. In
practice, what passes for relativism is simply political activity; peo-
ple (cultures) pursuing their own interests by the most appropriate
means in light of the desired goals and the context within which
actions are taken. Relativistic tolerance is practiced when cultural
differences are not threatening. Tolerance can and does disappear
as quickly as it appears; Indian ways are fine when those ways do
not present too great an obstacle to the white man's desires, but
they are wrong and intolerable when they do.
Prior to the entry of relativistic notions into the worlds of
academia and government policy making, the Euro-American the-
ory and practice of comparativism served as a justification for the
education of non-Western cultures in the ways of the West. Cul-
tural relativism has been understood, and indeed was touted as a
reaction against racist practices and notions of cultural superiority
permitted by these prior theories and practices; a "savior" in re-
sponse to the often gross excesses practiced by the ethnocentric
actor or thinker. However, far from its asserted freedom from cul-
ture and values, the new arrival on the Western intellectual scene
was a politically motivated movement that substituted one errone-
ous notion for another. The error of the belief in Euro-American
cultural superiority was replaced by a rationalized resignation to
the absence of the possibility of finding substantive truth. Propo-
nents of relativism substituted for obvious ethnocentrism what
they claimed was a methodological practice which was free from
the cultural bias and valued premises that had preceded. In fact,
what they had "discovered" was simply another position rooted in
the politics of its proponents, and equally ethnocentric in its
origin.
Under the guise of neutrality, relativist doctrine has been used
for the purpose of westernizing non-Western peoples, visiting "pro-
gress" on the world. This is not to say that the methods by which
the westernization of other cultures took place did not, in some
instances, change from the physically brutal impositions of West-
ern wills, ways, values, and symbols upon other cultures; surely
they did. Nor do I claim that the cultural relativists were inten-
tionally malevolent, consciously seeking to replace obvious and
heavy-handed apparatuses of cultural destruction with more subtle
and perhaps more effective (by virtue of their disguise) mecha-
nisms to accomplish the same thing. The point is, however, that
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Euro-American ethnocentrism did not die with the introduction of
relativism and the insistence upon its validity, feasibility, and
moral necessity. Rather, relativism was adopted as a philosophical
foundation, and quickly put to use as a mechanism whose imple-
mentation might succeed where the use of brutal physical oppres-
sion was no longer feasible, acceptable, or relevant to the never-
ending task of educating the non-Western world in the ways of the
West.
What then is this debate between the relativists and nonrela-
tivists about? Are there really two sides, or are anthropologists, le-
gal scholars, and philosophers making more of the dispute than
there is?
There is surely some difference, but the difference does not lie
in the lengthy discourse concerned with the relativistic nature of
all experience and the impossibility of recognizing truth. The
emergence of cultural relativism was a response to the atrocities
that preceded-atrocities of science, philosophy, and practice. The
relativists were not pleased with what was being done in the name
of the good, the right, the true. It seems that cultural relativism
can be understood as having been a caveat, a calling to the atten-
tion of researchers and policy makers that our knowledge indeed is
limited and that much of what has been done in the name of the
right has been unjustified. In its most favorable light, relativism
asks the dominant and resourceful Westerners to think, to consider
the consequences of their actions before acting on other cultures.
We have no idea, cautions the relativist, whether our actions will
result in good or harm. We have no idea whether or not what we
understand about other cultures has any validity. Accordingly,
when we do act we ought to do so with caution and concern.
Relativist method does not get one closer to the truth. Relativ-
ist philosophy is no philosophy at all. Relativist practice is neither
more nor less than any other sort of politics. A discussion of rela-
tivism as any of these explains nothing, and does not justify its
exalted place in either anthropology or cross-cultural policy plan-
ning. Relativism can be made palatable only if it is understood as
an attempt by a group of individuals to impose an ethical stan-
dard-albeit their own ethical standard-on those who come into
contact with other cultures. Seen in this light, relativism does not
offer specific solutions to the cross-cultural actor. It does not tell
us whether or not Hitler or Ghenghis Khan should have been
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stopped. It does not tell us that a culturally dictated gang rape
should be tolerated simply because it is the practice of another cul-
ture. It does not answer the questions of whether or not there is an
absolute truth and whether or not we will be able to find it. What
it does is remind us that when we do act or choose not to act on or
with another culture, we ought to do so with the awareness that
our actions may neither be right, nor good, nor true. It surely re-
minds us-by way of the insoluble dilemma it presents-that what
we desperately need is what relativism rejects: that which is true.
Although they do not suffer from the same logical flaws shown
to be fatal to the internal coherence and consistency of relativist
doctrine, the ethnocentric theories of the past and the knowledge
that comes from these must be rejected. However, they must not
be rejected only because they have grown out of the particular con-
ditions found in this or that culture. Rather, they must be rejected
because they are wrong, bad, and untrue. That we cannot make
such statements easily is no reason to embrace the relativist asser-
tion of the impossibility of knowing truth. For without truth we
are forced to live in a world where all human activity is a function
of power, organized according to personal desire, where all we
know is power, its users, its victims, the imposition of the wills of
some on others with no justification but arbitrary desire.
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